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SIMPLE POLICY RULES IN A SMALL OPEN ECONOMY 
 
Abstract 
Applying a stochastic dynamic general equilibrium model, the performance 
of various simple rules is analyzed in a small open economy context. The 
aspects that are considered in the analysis include the degree of exchange 
rate pass-through, trade openness, the policy objective and the source and 
persistency of shocks. The main objective of this analysis is to investigate if 
the rule reacts to exchange rate performs better than the basic closed 
economy rule without exchange rate term. Comparison on the performances 
is also made between the consumer inflation targeting and domestic inflation 
targeting rules. The results show that adding the exchange rate term to the 
policy rule enhances improvement especially in the higher pass-through case. 
The superior rule is the hybrid rule that reacts to the exchange rate term. CPI 
inflation targeting rules outperform the domestic inflation targeting rules in 
term of welfare loss. However, more complicated domestic inflation 
targeting rules generate lower loss in term of relative loss. On the second part 
of this chapter, comparisons on the performances of different exchange rate 
regimes are made under different source and persistency of shocks. The 
floating (pegged) regime is favored under more prominent real (nominal) 
shocks. The results suggest that emerging countries that experience very 
large real shocks should float their exchange rate. 
 
 1 Introduction 
 
Should the policy reaction function in emerging market react to the exchange rate 
movements? Given that emerging market is financially unstable and vulnerable to shocks and 
leads a different economic structure from the closed economy, it is argued that the monetary 
policy reaction function in the small open economy should consider a direct role for the 
exchange rate.  
The main reasons for such monetary policy are: first, monetary policy rule that 
contains the exchange rate term may internalize the total effects of policy adjustment on 
economy; second, this augmented rule improves the effectiveness of simple rule as it 
incorporates a faster adjustment of interest rate and exchange rate effects on inflationary 
impulse; third, it prevents the destabilizing effects of real shocks led by the exchange rate 
misalignment (Adolfson (2007)). 
Contrary to this view, some economists and researchers hold the opposite view to 
prefer the policy rule without a direct exchange rate term. The explanations as mentioned in 
Taylor (2001) are: first, there is an indirect effect of exchange rate on inflation and output in 
the policy reaction function; second, the deviation of exchange rate from purchasing power 
parity such as productivity should not be offset through interest rate adjustments. Adjusting 
the changes in exchange rate may generate negative effects on real output and inflation.   
Apart from the theoretical arguments, the results from the empirical studies are 
controversial as well. The issue regarding the role of exchange rate in the monetary policy 
framework for the open economies still open for debates. Focusing on the effects of exchange 
rate pass-through and trade openness in emerging market environment, this chapter seeks to 
compare the performances of various simple policy rules with the closed economy rule and if 
the augmented Taylor rules with exchange rate terms perform better compare to the other 
rules. Taking into account the economic characters for the emerging East-Asian countries, this 
chapter seeks to evaluate the role of exchange rate in the design of monetary policy for the 
emerging countries. This chapter applies two different approaches of analysis which divides it 
into two main parts. In the first part of this chapter, simulations are carried out to compare a 
battery of restricted optimized simple policy rules under different degrees of exchange rate 
pass-through and trade openness. For the robustness purpose, simulations are repeated by 
considering different persistency and variation of shocks and policy weighting.  In the second 
part of this chapter, a different approach of analysis is conducted to evaluate the exchange rate 
regimes (flexible, managed floating and fixed exchange rate regimes). Simulations are based 
on several simple rules which represent different exchange rate regimes. Evaluations on the 
regimes are based on the source, the persistency and variation of shocks, given different cases 
of exchange rate pass-through. Evaluations are followed by robustness checking.  
The results of simulations show that modifications on the baseline Taylor rule by 
adding the exchange rate terms and history dependence term (interest rate smoothing term or 
lagged inflation) improve the baseline rule.  These rules perform better under higher exchange 
rate pass-through but the size of improvement could be smaller for the very high pass-through 
case when the economy is more open as the price distortion is smaller and the role of 
exchange rate in adjusting price is smaller under more open economy case. These results are 
robust under different policy weighting and persistency of shocks. The hybrid rule with 
exchange rate term outperforms all the other rules. On the other hand, the strict inflation 
targeting rule performs badly.  
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section two discusses the role of 
exchange rate in the monetary policy framework. Section three presents the model and 
discusses the structures of different monetary policy rules.  Section four is about the 
methodology and parameterization. Section five summarizes the main results of first 
approach. The last section concludes.  
 
 
 
 2 The role of exchange rate in the monetary policy 
 
Emerging economies exhibit very different economic structures/ features compare to the 
developed economies. One of the main differences is that these economies are strongly 
affected by external shocks. This feature has been incorporating into the small open economy 
model, for instance the New Keynesian model and the New Open Economy Macroeconomic 
(NOEM) model setups. In the small open economy setup, the foreign sector and external 
shocks equations are added to the domestic sector counterpart. The monetary policy setup and 
the economic transmission mechanisms in the open economy also differ to that of the closed 
economy context.  
According to Monacelli (2003), the closed and open economy models are not 
isomorphic to each other in which the inclusion of the incomplete pass-through in the open 
economy counterpart differentiates the analysis in its monetary policy from the closed 
economy counterpart. By allowing the incomplete exchange rate pass-through and deviations 
from the law of one price in the short-run, exchange rate plays an important role in the 
economic transmission and monetary policy assessment in the small open economy. 
Exchange rate can influence the domestic inflation directly through its impacts on import 
price or indirectly via aggregate demand which is affected by the change in the relative prices 
between the foreign and domestic goods. Aggregate demand affects inflation via aggregate 
supply. Due to the exchange rate effect on both aggregate demand and supply relations, the 
monetary authority in the open economy faces a trade-off between inflation and output 
variability.  
Apart from these, exchange rate also adds to the monetary policy transmission 
channel in addition to the interest rate channel. As in the case of closed economy, a rise in a 
shock (for example demand shock) leads to the increase in the interest rate. However, unlike 
the case in the closed economy that the rise in interest rate does not affect inflation, the rise in 
interest rate in the open economy may lead to appreciation in exchange rate which may 
influence the inflation and output movements (Adolfson (2001)). This leaves the monetary 
authority in the trade-off between inflation and output variability. On the other hand, 
responding to the exchange rate movements may affect the inflation rate. Therefore, the 
monetary policy problem in the open economy is no more limited to the trade-off between 
inflation and output variability, but an additional trade-off between inflation and exchange 
rate targeting (Dobrynskaya (2008)).  
 
2.1 The role of exchange rate in the monetary policy from different aspects 
 
The role of exchange rate in the monetary policy framework and the effectiveness of a 
monetary policy are determined by the economic conditions and country specific factors. 
Among these factors include the degree of exchange rate pass-through and trade openness, the 
source and persistency of shocks. This section explains how these factors are relevant or link 
to the choice and effectiveness of monetary policy rule/ regime.  
Exchange rate pass-through is the percentage change in the domestic/ imported prices 
led by a one percentage change in the exchange rate between the importer and exporter 
currency. Previous studies show that both the exchange rate pass-through and monetary 
policy rule/ regime are closely linked to each other. According to Dobrynskaya (2008), the 
optimal degree of intervention depends on the pass-through effect in an economy. In turn, 
pass-through effect is endogenous to the monetary policy, i.e. pass-through tends to be larger 
under no exchange rate management case. According to Devereux & Yetman (2009), if the 
incomplete pass-through is due to the stickiness in price, the degree of pass-through is likely 
to be determined by the stance of monetary policy such as the one suggested by Taylor 
(2000). Taylor argues that the decline in the exchange rate pass-through is endogenous to low 
inflation. Commitment to low inflationary pressure induces lower pass-through rate. In turn, 
low pass-through rate leads to lower mark-ups and less inflationary and continued low mark-
ups. This view is supported by many empirical results, for example Choudhri & Hakura 
 (2006) and Bussière & Peltonen (2008). According to Devereux & Yetman (2009), the 
change in the exchange rate pass-through has important implications on the monetary policy 
stance due to three main reasons. First, the introduction of the partial pass-through feature in 
the open economy model provides analysis of monetary policy in the open economy which is 
fundamentally different from the one of a closed economy. Second, due to the deviations from 
the law of one price, incomplete pass-through generates a short-run trade-off in inflation and 
output stability. Third, the trade-off in the policy in the forward-looking setup implies 
different features in commitment and discretionary policy in which the discretionary policy is 
of sub-optimal.  
There are many papers that investigate the implications of incomplete exchange rate 
pass-through on the monetary policy stance. These studies analyze the change in the degree of 
exchange rate pass-through due to the change in price stickiness and its implications on the 
welfare gain of different policy rules or the change in the inflation rate. Devereux et al. (2006) 
compare three types of policy rules, i.e. the fixed exchange rate, the CPI inflation targeting 
and the nontraded price targeting rules for an emerging market economy. They demonstrate 
that the degree of exchange rate pass-through matters in determining the ranking of policy 
rules. In the high pass-through case, stabilizing exchange rate induces the trade-off between 
inflation and output stability and the best rule is the nontraded price targeting rule. In the low 
pass-through case, the best rule is the CPI inflation targeting rule. The reason is when the 
pass-through is low, the exchange rate movement is not desirable as it no longer acts as an 
expenditure switching device and the trade-off disappears. Lower pass-through rate implies 
smaller role of exchange rate channel in transmitting policy and lower impacts of external 
shocks on domestic economy. In the case of partial pass-through, the response of optimal 
monetary policy to shock may imply different adjustments in aggregate supply. Adolfson 
(2001) demonstrates that the performance of a monetary policy rule can be improved 
marginally by including the exchange rate term in the policy rule. Accounting for the price 
stickiness and distribution of shocks in the exchange rate pass-through model, Devereux & 
Yetman (2009) find that exchange rate pass-through is positively correlated with average 
inflation. Flamini (2005) conducts an analysis on the effect of imperfect pass-through on 
optimal monetary policy in a new Keynesian small open economy model. The main finding is 
the type and the degree of pass-through determine the ability of a central bank to stabilize the 
short-run CPI inflation but not domestic inflation. Delayed pass-through reduces the 
effectiveness in monetary policy more than incomplete pass-through. The results favor for 
domestic inflation targeting in the case of incomplete and delayed pass-through as incomplete 
pass-through reduces the variability of economy with domestic inflation but turns out to 
increase the trade-off in monetary policy with CPI inflation targeting. The trade-off is larger 
the more the central bank is emphasized on CPI inflation relative to output stability.  
There are many studies that examining how openness is related to the choice or 
performance of monetary policy. Wang (2005) finds significant correlation between the trade 
openness and the choice of fixed exchange rate regime. Kollmann (2004) finds higher welfare 
gain of a monetary union compare to the floating regime under higher openness case. Other 
studies reveal negative relationship between openness and inflation. The negative relationship 
is due to the dynamic inconsistency of optimal unrestricted discretionary monetary policy 
(Alfaro, 2002).  
The degree of trade openness could be matter in determining the role of exchange rate 
in the monetary policy. Theoretically, a more open economy means higher exposure of 
domestic economy to foreign shocks. Hence, exchange rate plays a greater role in transmitting 
monetary policy under more open economy, analog to the case of higher pass-through rate 
(Adolfson (2001)).  
The source of shocks is closely linked to the choice and performance of policy 
regimes. Exchange rate literatures tells us that floating regimes work more effectively in the 
presence of large external or real shocks as these regimes provide less costly adjustments 
through relative prices. On the other hand, fixed regimes work well in dealing with more 
prominent domestic or nominal shocks (Cavoli & Rajan (2003) and Calvo & Mishkin 
 (2003)). This implies that the nature of shocks is crucial in determining the performance of a 
policy regime. At the other end, the policy regimes could be matter in determining the 
transmissions and influences of shocks (Desroches (2004) and Hoffmaister et al. (1997)).  
Apart from this, the source of shocks also matters in determining the role of exchange 
rate as a shock absorber. Exchange rate has a room for stabilizing and can act as a shock 
absorber only when an economy experiences asymmetric shocks compare to its trading 
partner (Artis & Ehrmann (2006)). Therefore, under the existence of asymmetric shocks, the 
cost of relinquish the exchange rate will be high. Using a sample of 38 developing countries, 
Hoffmann (2005) seeks to compare to what extent the exchange rate regimes matter in 
utilizing the role of exchange rate as a shock absorber. His results indicate that economies 
with floating exchange rate regimes tend to experience real exchange rate depreciation, hence 
more prominent role for the exchange rate to act as a shock absorber under floating regimes. 
Previous studies show that emerging countries experience higher pass-through rate 
into domestic prices (Devereux et al. (2005)). The emerging East-Asian countries also exhibit 
higher trade openness over time. Higher openness induces greater aggregate volatility. 
Previous studies indicate that the rise in aggregate volatility due to the same size increase in 
trade openness in the developing countries is five times higher in that in  the developed 
countries (Giovanni & Levchenko (2008)). These statements imply that emerging countries 
are weak to the exposure of external shocks. Therefore, the change in the economic structure 
such as the degree of exchange rate pass-through, trade openness and the source of shocks 
could be matter in determining the performance of monetary policy in these countries. Due to 
this condition, this chapter highlights the above aspects/ factors in evaluating the 
performances of various policy rules.  
 
3 The model 
 
For some exceptions, the model follows Lindé, Nessén & Söderström (2004). This model 
exhibits the habit formation in consumption, imperfect integration in financial market and 
gradual pass-through in exchange rate. Habit formation in consumption generates inertia in 
consumption and output and imperfect financial integration implies that there is a premium on 
foreign exchange.   
The model assumes imperfect pass-through in the short-run where import price is 
sticky and producer faces quadratic adjustment cost when re-optimizing the price. However, 
deviations from the law of one price disappear and the pass-through is complete in the long-
run. The model assumes a subset of firms re-optimizes prices while the others follow a rule of 
thumb in setting their prices.   
The model applies here is a hybrid New Keynesian/ NOEM model. The basic blocks 
of the model consist of the aggregate demand/ IS curve, aggregate supply/ Phillips curve 
(domestic inflation, imported inflation and CPI inflation), UIP (uncovered interest parity) 
condition, net foreign assets and real profits equations, terms of trade equations (foreign and 
domestic), foreign sector equations, nominal and real exchange rate equations, exogenous 
shocks equations and monetary policy rule equations. The model is log-linearized around the 
steady state. All equations mentioned here are in log deviations from the steady state (with the 
exception of interest rate) and are denoted in lower case letters. All notations and equations 
mentioned below here are as indicated in Lindé, Nessén & Söderström (2004), otherwise it 
will be indicated. 
 
3.1 Imperfect pass-through, terms of trade and real exchange rate 
 
This model assumes the domestic residents consume both domestically produced goods and 
imported goods. Exchange rate pass-through is not perfect in the short run, implying 
deviations from the law of one price in the short run. The wedge between the two price levels 
can be captured in two different terms of trade, i.e. the domestic and foreign terms of trade.  
 Domestic terms of trade ( tτ ) show the log linearized relative price between imported (
m
tp  ) 
and domestic goods ( dtp ): 
m d
t t tp pτ ≡ −  
Foreign terms of trade ( ftτ ) show the logarithmic relative price between the domestically 
produced good and the imported good on the world market denoted in domestic currency: 
f d f
t t t tp e pτ ≡ − − ,   
where te  is the log nominal exchange rate and 
f
tp  is the log foreign currency price of 
imported good. Due to imperfect pass-through, the law of one price does not hold i.e. 
m f
t t tp p e≠ +  and the deviation from the law of one price ( tδ ) is: 
m f f
t t t t t tp p eδ τ τ= − − = +  
Given that the non-logarithmized CPI is a product of weighted log domestic and log imported 
price, the log terms of trade is correlated with the log real exchange rate ( tq ): 
(1 )c d mt m t m tp p pω ω= − +  
f c f
t t t t t m tq e p p τ ω τ≡ + − = − −  
where mω  denotes the import share in consumption and also the weight on imported inflation. 
The degree of exchange rate pass-through determines the movements in terms of trade. This 
effect later is transmitted to the real exchange rate and other economic variables. 
 
3.2.1 Aggregate supply and Phillips curve 
 
The inflation dynamic in this model is described by the hybrid Phillips curves or inflation 
equations which captures the forward- and backward-looking components. The forward- and 
backward-looking behaviors may reflect the learning effects, staggered contracts or other 
institutional arrangements (Garresten, Moons & Aarle (2005)).  
There are two sets of firms in this model, i.e. the imported goods and the domestic 
goods sectors. Firms of imported goods sector import goods from the foreign market at given 
world prices. The goods are transformed into differentiated goods and are sold to be used for 
domestic consumption or as an input in production. Combining both domestic and imported 
inputs, firms in domestic sector produce differentiated goods to be sold to the domestic and 
foreign market.  
The price setting behavior of firms when facing the quadratic adjustment cost ( jγ ) is 
modeled as the minimization of the deviation of the expected log linearized price set ( ˆ jt sp + ) 
from the optimal flexible price ( ,opt jt sp + ): 
{ }, , 2 , , 21
0
ˆmin ( ) ( )
opt j
t
s opt j j opt j opt j
t t s t s j t s t sp s
E p p p pβ γ
∞
+ + + + −
=
− + −∑  j=d, m  
(d denotes domestic sector and m denotes import sector) 
where the optimal flexible price is derived from the profit maximization process under the 
absence of adjustment costs. Only (1 )jα−  fraction of firms re-optimizes prices. A fraction 
of jα  from domestic and import sectors are rule of thumb price setters by setting prices (
,rule j
tp ) based on the aggregate price in previous period adjusted for its previous inflation rate.  
,
1 1
rule j j j
t t tp p π− −= + ,  j=d, m 
Both price setting behaviors determine the aggregate price and inflation for the domestic 
economy: 
 , ,(1 )j opt j rule jt j t j tp p pα α= − + ,   j=d, m 
After some substitutions and solving procedures, the log-linearized version of Phillips curves/ 
inflation equations for the domestic economy can be written as:  
1 1 2 1 3 2
d d d d
t t t t t y t t tb E b b b y b u
π
π π π τπ π π π τ+ − −= + + + + +  
1 1 2 1 3 2
m m m m f
t t t t t t tc E c c cπ π π τπ π π π τ τ+ − −  = + + + +   
where dtπ  and 
m
tπ  are domestic and imported inflation (both in log deviation from steady 
state) respectively. The composite parameters are given by: 
1
2
3
(1 2 )
(1 )
1
d d
d d d d
d d d
d
y d
b
b
b
b
π
π
π
βγ
α γ βγ
α γ
θ α
θ
= Ψ
= + + Ψ
= − Ψ
−
= Ψ
−
  
2
3
(1 2 )
(1 )
m m m m
m m m
m m
c
c
c
π
π
τ
α γ βγ
α γ
α
= + + Ψ
= − Ψ
= − − Ψ
 
1
(1 )d d
m m
b
c
τ
π
κ α
βγ
= − Ψ
= Ψ
   
1
(1 2 )j j j jα γ βα
−
 Ψ = + +  ; j=d, m 
where the notations for parameters are summarized in Table A(3) in Appendix A  as in 
Lindé, Nessén & Söderström (2004). 
The domestic inflation dtπ   depends on the expected future and previous domestic 
inflation rates, current output, terms of trades and inflation shock. On the other hand, the 
imported inflation mtπ  is determined by both future and previous imported inflation rate and 
the short-run price deviation i.e. 0ft tδ τ τ= + ≠ . This hybrid Phillips curve captures the 
imperfect pass-through feature of East-Asian countries. The presence of import price 
stickiness cτ  implies that the domestic currency price cannot be fully adjusted under the 
exchange rate changes. This creates short-run deviations from the law of one price i.e. 
f
t t tδ τ τ= + . The price stickiness parameter ( cτ ) depends on the adjustment cost ( jγ ) and 
the fraction of rule of thumb price setters ( jα ). When both parameters are relatively small, 
the price stickiness is weaker and thus exchange rate pass-through is higher or faster. The CPI 
inflation equation is a combination of domestic inflation and imported inflation. 
(1 )c d mt m t m tπ ω π ω π= − +  
The Phillips curves in this model are in hybrid form. Empirical studies show that 
hybrid Phillips curve matches the data better compared to the purely forward-looking and 
purely backward-looking Phillips curve. For instance, Christiano et al. (1998) in their VAR 
studies find that the purely forward-looking Phillips curve is unable to replicate the hump-
shaped of impulse response functions. A backward-looking component is introduced to the 
forward-looking New Keynesian Phillips curve to create the persistence of inflation rate. For 
example, Altig et al. (2002) introduce the rule of thumb behavior of price setters in the New 
Keynesian model. 
 
3.3 Aggregate demand and IS curve 
 
As shown in Lindé, Nessén & Söderström (2004), this model assumes that households 
consume both bundles of domestic and import goods. The households’ consumption today is 
affected by the past aggregate consumption behavior which is denoted by the habit preference 
parameter (h) where 0 1h≤ ≤  and intertemporal elasticity of substitution, 0σ >  : 
 ( ) ( )
1
1
1
j
t tj
t
C hC
u C
σ
σ
−
−−=
−
 
Household j maximizes her intertemporal utility by choosing the level of consumption, 
domestic bond holdings and foreign bond holdings.  
( ),, , 0
max
j j f j
t t t
k j
t k
C B B k
E u Cβ
∞
+
=
∑  s.t 
, ,
1 1
(1 ) (1 ) ( )
j f j j f j
j jt t t t t t
t tc f c c c
t t t t t t t
B B B BC X
i P i A P P P
− −Ξ Ξ+ + = + +
+ + Φ
 
where jtB  and 
,f j
tB  are bonds denominated in the domestic and foreign currency 
respectively; ti  and 
f
ti  are the domestic and foreign interest rate repectively; 
c
tP   is the 
consumer price level; tΞ  the nominal exchange rate and  
j
tX  the aggregate real profits of 
household j; ( ) tAtA e
φ−Φ =  is the premium to hold foreign bond which depends on the real 
aggregate net foreign asset in domestic economy 
f
t t
t c
t
BA
P
Ξ
=  (see (Lindé, Nessén & 
Söderström (2004)) for more details).  
The utility maximization problem yields the Euler equation for consumption. After 
imposing some equilibrium conditions to the log-linearized Euler equation, the IS curve can 
be expressed as (Lindé, Nessén & Söderström (2004)): 
 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 1(1 )
d
t y t y t t r t t t t t t ty a y a E y a i E a a a Eτ τ τπ τ τ τ− + + − + = − + + − + + +   
  
11 2 3 1 1 1 2 3 1t
f f f f f f y
f f t f t t yf t yf t yf t t ta a a E a y a y a E y uτ τ ττ τ τ− + − ++ + + + + + +    
where lower case letters denote log deviation from the steady state. The composite parameters 
are given by: 
1
1y
a
h
=
+
     1 1
x
f
ha
hτ
ω η
=
+
 
(1 )(1 )
(1 )
x
r
ha
h
ω
σ
− −
= −
+
    2f xaτ ω η= −  
1
(1 )
1
m xha
hτ
ηω ω−
= −
+
    3 1
x
fa hτ
ω η
=
+
 
2
(1 )(1 )
(1 )
m x h ha
hτ
ω ω ησ ησ
σ
− − − −
= −
+
  1 1
x f
yf
h
a
h
ω χ
= −
+
 
3
(1 )(1 )
(1 )
m xha
hτ
ω ησ ω
σ
− − −
=
+
   2yf x fa ω χ=  
3 1
x f
yfa h
ω χ
= −
+
 
where the notations for parameters are summarized in Table A(3) in Appendix A. The hybrid 
IS curve combines both the forward- and backward-looking components in representing the 
goods market equilibrium. ty  denotes the domestic output, tτ  the domestic terms of trade, 
f
tτ  the foreign terms of trade, ti  the domestic short term nominal interest rate, 
f
ty  the 
foreign output and ytu  the demand shocks. All variables except the interest rate are in 
logarithms form and are given in the form of deviation from the initial steady state. 
The hybrid IS curve shows that the domestic output depends on its past output, the 
expected future output, the real interest rate, its past, current and expected future  terms of 
 trade, the past, current and expected future foreign terms of trade and also the past, current 
and expected future foreign output. The backward-looking component is the results of the 
‘habit formation’ of household consumption while the forward-looking component is 
explained by the optimal consumption smoothing behavior of rational, intertemporally 
maximizing agents (Garrestsen, Moons & Aarle (2005)). 
Literatures show that the hybrid IS curve matches the data better compare to the forward-
looking IS curve (Mayer (2003) and Goodhart & Hofmann (2005)). Therefore, the backward-
looking components are added to the forward-looking New Keynesian IS curve through two 
ways, i.e. through the rule of thumb consumption behavior (e.g. Gali & Gertler (1999)) and 
the habit formation in household’s utility function (e.g. Ratto et al. (2005)). In this model, the 
backward-lookingness in IS curve is due to the habit formation of household.  
 
3.4 Uncovered interest parity (UIP) 
 
The uncovered interest parity (UIP) condition takes the following form as in Adolfson (2001): 
1
f e
t t t t t tE e i i a uφ+∆ = − + +  
where φ  is the measurement for the intermediate cost in foreign bond market or risk 
premium; ta as net foreign asset holdings in domestic market; 
e
tu  is the disturbance term. The 
UIP condition is derived from the household’s maximization problem. It shows that the 
exchange rate adjustment depends on the relative difference rate of domestic interest rate and 
foreign interest rate, the impacts of risk premium (φ )  on net foreign asset in domestic market 
( ta ) and the disturbance term or the exchange rate shock  that follows the AR(1) process: 
1
e e e
t e t tu uρ υ−= +  
 
3.5 Net foreign assets and real profits 
 
The log-linearized version of the net foreign assets in the domestic market ( ta ) is represented 
by the following equation: 
1
f f
t a t y t x t t f t yf ta d a d y d x d d d yτ ττ τ−= + + + + +  
where tx  and 
f
ty  are the log-linearized real profit and log-linearized foreign demand 
respectively given that  
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f x
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and  
  1
(1 )
(1 )(1 )
m d
d m m d m m d
η θ η θ
η η η θ η θ ω ω η
− +
Γ ≡
− − + − −
 
  
 2 1( 1)(1 )(1 )
d
d
κ κ
η
η θ κ κ−
Γ ≡
− − −
 
where the notations for parameters are summarized in Table A(3) in Appendix A. This 
equation shows that the net foreign asset hold by the domestic households depends on its last 
period value 1ta − , the foreign and domestic output or demand level, the foreign and domestic 
terms of trades and the real profit earned, tx . 
 
As shown in Lindé, Nessén & Söderström (2004), the real profits equation tx  takes the 
following form: 
f f
t y t t f t yf tx e y e e e yτ ττ τ= + + +       
where 
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The real profits of holding assets depend on both the foreign and domestic output level and 
terms of trades in both markets. 
 
3.6 Foreign sector and exogenous shocks 
 
In order to close the model, the behavioral equations for the foreign economy have to be 
specified. As East-Asian countries are small and open economies, they receive the impacts of 
shocks from the foreign economy exogenously. It is assumed that the foreign sector can be 
represented by AR(1) processes as in Adolfson (2001):   
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The shocks are uncorrelated zero mean i.i.d. disturbances with variance 2yfσ  and 
2
fπσ  
respectively. The foreign interest rate is assumed to follow a simple Taylor rule: 
f f f f f if
t t y t ti y uπλ π λ= + +        
where iftu  is the foreign monetary policy shock with zero mean and variance 
2
ifσ . There are 
six shocks in this model: three domestic shocks (demand shock, exchange rate shock and 
cost-push/ inflation shock) and three foreign shocks (foreign demand shock, foreign cost-push 
shock and foreign monetary policy shock). The domestic shocks are assumed to follow AR(1) 
 processes as in Adolfson (2001) where 1
j j j
t j t tu uρ υ−= +  with 0 1jρ≤ <  , , ,j y eπ=  and 
j
tυ  is white noise, 
2(0, )j jNυ σ . The AR(1) processes for the domestic output, domestic 
cost-push and exchange rate shocksare as follows: 
1
y y y
t y t tu uρ υ−= +  
1t t tu u
π π π
πρ υ−= +   
1
e e e
t e t tu uρ υ−= +  
                   
3.7 Monetary policy rules 
 
This section discusses the optimal simple rules and optimal rules with exchange rate and 
interest rate smoothing terms. 
 
3.7.1 Optimal and simple rules 
 
According to Rudebusch & Svensson (1998), there are two classes of policy rules: instrument 
and targeting rules. Optimal policy or the targeting rule determines the optimal policy 
responses given a set of objectives. It minimizes the objective loss function that deviates from 
a target variable.   
The (unrestricted) optimal policy can be distinguished between discretion and 
commitment strategies (Garrestsen, Moons & Aarle (2005)). Under the commitment rule, the 
central bank is credible to set an optimal policy and the agents form expectations according to 
this rule. Under the discretion rule however, the central bank takes private expectations as 
given and re-optimizes the policy each period (Söderström (1999)). 
 As defined by Rudebusch & Svensson (1998), a simple rule or an explicit instrument 
rule is a monetary policy instrument based rule that reacts explicitly to available information. 
As this rule shows higher transparency and better communication to the public, it serves as a 
baseline rule for the comparison of actual policy. (Garrestsen, Moons & Aarle (2005)). 
The (restricted) optimal simple rule is a sub-optimal rule which is subject to a 
conditional or restricted state variable set. Using the sub-optimal information set, this rule 
serves as a comparison to examine the optimal state-contingent rule’s performance (Dennis 
(2000)). This chapter focuses on the analysis of (restricted) optimal simple rules.  
 
3.7.2 The formation/ setting of optimal simple rules 
 
The model is closed by assuming a linear interest rate rule for the domestic small open 
economy. As in Wollmershäuser (2006), the simple rules take the constrained 
optimization. The minimization of the policy maker’s intertemporal loss function on a 
restricted state variable set can be written as: 
{ }
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subject to the state and evolution of the economy. Restrictions are imposed on the 
response coefficients to short-term interest rate. The weights on inflation and output are 
assumed to be πγ  and yγ  respectively. By normalizing πγ  to one, yγ  is the relative 
weight on output stabilization to inflation assigned by the society or central bank. The 
central bank can target on consumer/ CPI inflation or domestic inflation, i.e. 
{ },CB c dt t tπ π π= . However in the real world, most of the central bank target on core CPI 
inflation or headline CPI inflation.  
As shown in Svensson (2003), the scaled intertemporal loss function can be written in the 
following way when the discount factor β  is approaching unity. 
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A short-run interest rate rule is used by the central bank as a policy instrument in 
order to minimize the loss function. Meanwhile, the domestic economy is assumed to 
follow a Taylor simple rule. This policy rule can be regarded as a closed economy rule as 
it does not react directly to the exchange rate movements.  
TR:  Taylor rule              
CB
t t y ti yπλ π λ= +  
where πλ  is the weight for CPI or domestic inflation, i.e. { },CB c dt t tπ π π=  and yλ  is the policy 
reaction’s weight on output ( ty ). The policy maker is concerned about both inflation (CPI or 
domestic) and output stability. 
This rule is used as a baseline rule for comparisons. This rule is compared with (i) 
simple rules with exchange rate terms (rule TRE1 and TRE2); (ii) history dependent rules 
(TRH) including the interest rate smoothing rule (TRS), interest rate smoothing rule with 
exchange rate term (TRSE) and history dependent with exchange rate term (TRHE); (iii) 
forecast based inflation targeting rules (FBT), i.e. Taylor rule with forward-looking term (TRF) 
and with exchange rate term (TRFE) and (iv) strict inflation targeting rule (SIT). These rules 
take the following forms: 
 
TRE1: TR with the change in nominal exchange rate 
1 1
CB
t t y t e ti y eπλ π λ λ∆= + + ∆  
TRE2: TR with the change in real exchange rate 
1 1
CB
t t y t q ti y qπλ π λ λ∆= + + ∆  
TRS: TR with smoothing term 
1 1 1(1 )( )
CB
t i t y t i ti y iπρ λ π λ ρ −= − + +  
TRSE: TRS with exchange rate term 
1 1 1(1 )( )
CB
t i t y t q t i ti y q iπρ λ π λ λ ρ∆ −= − + + ∆ +  
TRH: TR with history dependent term (backward term in inflation) 
1 1 2 1
CB CB
t t y t ti yπ πλ π λ λ π −= + +  
TRHE: TRH with exchange rate term 
1 1 2 1
CB CB
t t y t t q ti y qπ πλ π λ λ π λ− ∆= + + + ∆  
TRF: TR with forward-looking term in inflation 
1 1 2 1
CB CB
t t y t t ti y Eπ πλ π λ λ π += + +  
TRFE: TRF with exchange rate term 
1 1 2 1
CB CB
t t y t t t q ti y E qπ πλ π λ λ π λ+ ∆= + + + ∆  
TRHI: Hybrid TR (forward and backward term in inflation) 
1 1 2 1 3 1
CB CB CB
t t y t t t ti y Eπ π πλ π λ λ π λ π+ −= + + +  
TRHIE: TRHI with exchange rate term  
1 1 2 1 3 1
CB CB CB
t t y t t t t q ti y E qπ π πλ π λ λ π λ π λ+ − ∆= + + + + ∆  
SIT: Strict inflation targeting rule 
1
CB
t ti πλ π=  
where eλ∆  or qλ∆  are the weights for exchange rate (the change in nominal exchange and the 
change in real exchange rate); 1πλ , 3πλ  and 3πλ  are the weights on inflation (CPI or 
 domestic) and 1yλ  is the weight on output. iρ  is the coefficient for the interest rate smoothing 
term.  
Since the introduction of Taylor rule, many studies have proposed different 
modifications to the structure of this rule in order to improve the performance of this rule 
when applying it to the open economy context. However, the results are quite controversial. 
The augmented Taylor rules with exchange rate terms are included in this analysis as many 
studies show that adding the exchange rate terms to the simple rules help to improve the 
performances of the rules (for example Ball (1999), Senay (2001) and Wollmershäuser 
(2006)). A number of empirical studies also show that the short-run interest rate in some 
countries reacts to the exchange rate terms (for example Brischetto and Voss (1999) and 
Mohanty & Klau (2005)). On the other hand, other studies show the opposite or mixed 
outcomes (for example Côté et. al. (2002) and Taylor (1999)). 
Besides comparing the simple Taylor rule with the rules that react to the exchange 
rate terms, this chapter also includes comparison of the policy rules with smoothing term. 
Literatures show that interest rate smoothing term is preferred in the analysis of monetary 
policy rules for several reasons. For instant, Mayer (2004) and Sack & Wieland (1999) claim 
that the interest rate smoothing term should include in the Taylor rule as it reflects the real or 
observable fact that the policy maker adjusts the interest rate gradually to the desired level. 
The preference to gradual adjustment behavior can be explained by three types of 
uncertainties faced by the policy maker, i.e. the model uncertainty, parameter uncertainty and 
data uncertainty. On the other hand, Woodford (2002) claims that interest rate smoothing rule 
outperforms the other rules in stabilizing inflation and output gap without requiring variation 
of interest rate. Other studies, for example Côté & Lam (2001) compare various simple rules 
using the vector error correction forecasting model for the Canadian economy. Their results 
show that the interest rate smoothing rule dominates the other rules by minimizing the 
volatility of output, inflation and interest rate. The reason for a better performance of this rule 
as explained in Levin, Wieland & Williams (1998) is that this rule enables policy makers to 
have greater control over the long term interest rate and thereby it has greater influence over 
the aggregate demand and inflation. On the other hand, Côté et al. (2002) show that interest 
rate smoothing rules perform poorly in most models. The reason is exchange rate acts as a 
stabilizer and shock absorber. Smoothing the fluctuations in exchange rate interferes with the 
adjustment process, hence causing more volatility in output and inflation. 
The history dependent rules and the rules with forecast term are also included in this 
analysis as previous studies show that these rules outperform the standard Taylor rule. For 
example, many studies show that the restricted history dependent rules outperform the 
standard Taylor rule (for instance Levin, Wieland & Williams (1998), Kimura & Kurozumi 
(2002) and Wohltmann & Winkler (2008)). On the other hand, the rules with forecast terms 
only perform slightly better relative to the standard rules (Levin, Wieland & Williams 
(1998)).  
Monetary policy literatures show that flexible inflation targeting is preferable over the 
strict inflation targeting as flexible inflation targeting allows the monetary authorities 
maintain stability in both inflation and output. In contrast, strict inflation targeting lead to 
larger output volatility. According to Svensson (1998), strict inflation targeting requires 
activism in monetary, i.e. achieving inflation stabilization at a relatively short horizon. This 
generates higher variability in macro variables other than inflation. 
 
3.8 Two highlights – exchange rate pass-through and trade openness 
 
In particular, this study seeks to investigate the effects of exchange rate pass-through and 
trade openness in the small open economy. In order to get different degrees of exchange rate 
pass-through and trade openness, the values of parameters are adjusted accordingly. These 
parameters include the adjustment cost in import sector ( mγ ), the fraction of producer in 
import sector that are rule of thumb price setters ( mα ), the share of imports in inputs (κ ), the 
 share of imports in consumption ( mω ) and the share of exports in domestic production ( xω ). 
Following the idea of Adolfson (2001), the first two parameters are adjusted to generate 
different degrees of exchange rate pass-through while the remaining three parameters are 
adjusted for the degrees of trade openness1
The increase in the adjustment cost and fraction of rule of thumb price setters in 
import sector induces higher price stickiness in import sector and hence lower pass-through of 
exchange rate into domestic economy. The intuition is higher adjustment cost discourages 
(imported sector) firms to re-optimize prices or re-optimize prices less often. On the other 
hand, higher fraction of firms set prices based on the rule of thumb means prices are more 
sticky as more and more firms set prices to the previous price level and hence pass-through is 
low. Both parameters determine the degree of exchange rate pass-through in domestic 
economy. The analysis of the effects of exchange rate pass-through in this study is based on 
the percentage change in import prices caused by an unidentified shock to the exchange rate. 
The degree of exchange rate pass-through can due to a ‘genuine’ exchange rate or by other 
economic disturbances (Adolfson (2001)). In this model, it is assumed that the incomplete 
pass-through is caused by nominal rigidities and the related structural parameter that 
determine the price stickiness. Following Adolfson (2001), the degree of exchange rate pass-
through is constructed through partial derivative of import price equation with respect to the 
exchange rate, assuming that the expected future inflation is zero.  
.  
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In order to investigate the effects of different degrees of exchange rate pass-through 
and trade openness, the values of parameters are adjusted as below: 
 
Table 1:Degrees of exchange rate pass-through (ERPT) 
 
mγ  mα  ERPT= 
1
c
c
τ
τ −
 
Case I: low PT 0.7 0.7 0.1123 
Case II: medium PT 0.3 0.3 0.4735 
Case III: high PT 0.1 0.1 0.8037 
Notes: Exchange rate pass-through (ERPT) is constructed from the Philips curve equation through the partial 
derivative of import price goods with respect to the exchange rate, assuming that the expectations of the future 
inflation are zero and discount rate β =0.99 
 
Table 1 displays three different degrees of exchange rate pass-through by setting 
different values for mγ  and mα . For simplicity, both parameters assume to take the same 
value and change at the same rate. However in reality, both parameters may have different 
values and do not necessarily increase or decrease at the same rate. This analysis only 
considers the case where both parameters increase or decrease simultaneously but does not 
consider the case where both parameters move at the opposite directions. It is reasonable to 
assume both parameters to move at the same direction as it is likely that the increase in the 
                                                          
1 In Adolfson (2001), the exchange rate pass-through is determined by one parameter only, i.e. the adjustment cost 
in import sector as her model does not exhibit the rule of thumb price setting behavior. 
 adjustment cost ( mγ ) may induce more firms to change their price setting behavior to rule of 
thumb price setters in order to avoid the drop of production due to the increase of price and to 
maintain the market competitiveness. 
Countries specific dataset (see Table 2(a)) show that East-Asian countries have 
different degrees of trade openness. Malaysia and Singapore have higher trade openness 
(which exceeds one) while the other countries such as Indonesia, Korea and Philippines have 
lower trade openness (below one)2
κ
. To see if trade openness matters in determining the 
economics achievement and the policy performance, the values of parameters for  (fraction 
of imported intermediate goods for production), mω  (fraction of imported goods for 
consumption) and xω  (fraction of domestic production goods that export to foreign market) 
are adjusted accordingly. These three parameters determine the degree of trade openness. 
Countries specific data show that the value for mω  is very low, consistent to the low imported 
goods for consumption in East-Asia. The value for κ  is higher relative to the other two 
parameters as East-Asian countries import relatively high fraction of intermediate goods for 
production (see Appendix A, Table A(1, 2a and 2b). This study considers two cases of trade 
openness. Table 2(b) shows that in the first case, the domestic economy has lower trade 
openness (as indication for pre-crisis period condition or for those countries with lower trade 
openness). In the second case, the domestic economy is very open (could be the possible 
condition for the post-crisis period or for countries that are more open)3
 
.  
Table 2(a): Trade openness, 1990-2006 
Countries 1990 1995 1997* 1998* 2000 2005 2006 
Indonesia 0.4152 0.4257 0.4409 0.7982 0.5796 0.4996 0.4439 
Korea 0.2976 0.4296 0.5107 0.6489 0.6504 0.7728 0.7984 
Malaysia 1.34332 1.7051 1.5679 1.8171 1.9212 1.8631 1.8680 
Philippines 0.4461 0.5636 0.6668 0.7749 0.8877 0.9686 0.9192 
Singapore 3.1324 2.8134 2.7697 2.6852 2.7312 3.4645 3.6847 
Thailand 0.6349 0.6907 0.7037 0.7884 0.8890 1.1828 1.2972 
Notes: All the data are obtained from Asia Development Bank (ADB) key indicators, 2007 
 
Table 2(b): Degrees of trade openness 
 κ  mω  xω  
Case (A): low openness 0.45 0.10 0.25 
Case (B): high openness 0.60 0.30 0.40 
      
4 Methodology and parameterization 
 
There is no close way to solve the model. The model has to be solved using the numerical 
simulations. The optimization procedure is based on the generalized Schur decomposition 
proposed by Sims (1995) and Klein (1997) as summarized in Appendix B. For further details 
of this method, see Söderlind (1999).  
Before running the simulations, all the relevant equations are listed. In sum, this 
model consists of 18 equations and can be summarized as follows: 
(1) 1 1 2 1 3 2
d d d d
t t t t t y t t tb E b b b y b u
π
π π π τπ π π π τ+ − −= + + + + +  
(2) 1 1 2 1 3 2
m m m m f
t t t t t t tc E c c cπ π π τπ π π π τ τ+ − −  = + + + +   
                                                          
2 Trade openness is defined as the total import and export of goods over the total GDP (see Table I-A(5) In 
Appendix I-A, Chapter Two). 
3 The degree of trade openness indicated here is for general condition for East-Asia but it may not able to represent 
the trade openness condition for all individual countries. The fraction of imported goods for consumption is very 
low (about 10%) for both pre- and post-crisis periods. It is set to be 0.30 in case B in order to capture the effects of 
larger degree of openness in simulations.  
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(8) ct t y ti yπλ π λ= +  
(9) f f f f f ift t y t ti y uπλ π λ= + +  
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f f f yf
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(15) m dt t tp pτ = −  
(16) f d ft t t tp e pτ ≡ − −  
(17)  1t t tq q q −∆ = −  
(18) ft t m tq τ ω τ= − −  
The model is written in a state space representation form and is solved numerically 
(see Appendix B). Before running the simulations, we need to give values to the parameters, 
either through calibration or estimation. In this chapter, there is no attempt to estimate 
parameters but the values of parameters are determined through calibrations and observations 
on dataset of East-Asian countries. The parameterizations applied in previous studies in the 
small open economy are quite different, depending on the belief and interpretation of 
researchers based on a general or specified economy’s condition. The parameterizations 
applied in this chapter are based on the general case for crisis-hit East-Asian countries as a 
whole. Therefore, the parameterizations may not fully represent the economic conditions for 
the individual East-Asian countries.  
Three parameters are set based on the data of East-Asian economies. These 
parameters include κ  (share of imports in inputs), mω  (share of imports in consumption) and 
xω  (share of exports in domestic production). Following the idea of Lindé, Nessén & 
Söderström (2004), the value for κ  is set by observing the data on imported inputs as 
percentage of total inputs in the producer and import stages. The value for mω  is referred to 
the data of average share of imported inflation in core inflation and xω  is referred to the data 
of average export share of GDP. In this study, the value of xω  is defined as in Lindé, Nessén 
& Söderström (2004), and the data is obtained from the Asian Development Bank (ADB), 
1989-2006, (see Appendix A, Table A(1)). The value for xω  is set to be 0.25 as the 
approximately value of xω  for most of the East Asian countries (with Malaysia and 
Singapore as exceptions) for the periods of 1989-1996 (before crisis). The value of xω  has 
increased in the post-crisis period. The data for κ  and mω  are referred to the report of 
RIETI-TID (2005) on the component of imports for Asian (see Appendix A, Table A(2a & 
 2b)). The values for κ  and mω  are approximately set to be 0.45 and 0.10 respectively. Later, 
these values are adjusted to generate higher degree of trade. 
 
Table 3: Parameterization 
Policy 
preference 
Supply relation Demand 
relation 
Foreign 
Taylor 
rule 
Shock 
persistence 
Standard 
error of 
shocks 
yγ =0.5 
πγ =1.0 
 
mγ =0.1, 0.3, 0.7 
dα =0.5 
mα =0.1, 0.3, 0.7 
dγ =5 
mω =0.10, 0.3 
κ =0.45, 0.60 
θ =0.46 
 
η =0.9 
mη =5 
dη =5 
σ =1.2 
β =0.99 
xω =0.25, 0.4 
h=0.8 
fχ =0.9 
φ =0.10 
f
πλ =1.5 
f
yλ =0.5 
 
πρ =0.7 
yρ =0.7 
f
iρ =0.7 
f
yρ =0.7 
f
πρ =0.7 
eρ =0.7 
πσ =0.3 
yσ =0.3 
yfσ =0.3 
fπσ =0.3 
ifσ =0.3 
eσ =0.3 
 
 
The remaining values of parameters are unobservable and the calibrations are based 
on the assumption and interpretation of authors. The calibrations applied here are based on the 
literature of small open economies. The value of import price stickiness ( mγ ) and the fraction 
of producer in import sector that uses the rule of thumb as the pricing strategy ( mα ) are 
essential in the determination on the degree of exchange rate pass-through. Empirical studies 
show that the degree of exchange rate pass-through differs across countries and over time. 
The results of Chapter Two show that East-Asian countries exhibit different degrees of 
exchange rate pass-through and pass-through does not decline in all countries. In order to 
consider different degree of exchange rate pass-through condition for East-Asian countries, 
these values are adjusted to generate three different degrees of exchange rate pass-through: 
the low, medium and high degrees of exchange rate pass-through (see Table 1). As empirical 
studies show that pass-through into import price is highest but that of producer and consumer 
prices are low, the domestic price stickiness dγ  is assumed to be 5 which is higher than the 
price stickiness in import sector4
β
. The fraction of producer in the domestic sector that applies 
the rule of thumb in their pricing strategy is assumed to be 0.5, the value that assigned for the 
small open economy context (for example Flamini (2005) and Justiniano & Preston (2004)). 
Focusing the analysis in the case of South Korea, Elekdag et al. (2005) set the prior value for 
this parameter to be 0.6 and report the posterior value of 0.51. Following Cook & Devereux 
(2006b) who focus the study in crisis-hit East-Asian countries, the discount factor  is set to 
be 0.99, implying an annualized real interest rate of 4%.  
Previous studies report different values for the parameter of elasticity of substitution 
in multi-goods sectors. Cook and Devereux (2006a) assign the elasticity of substitution 
between traded and non-traded goods to be 0.66, between imported materials and domestic 
value added as 0.7 and between domestic goods and imports to be 0.6 in their studies in three 
East-Asian countries. Cook & Devereux (2006b) set the elasticity of substitution between 
individual retail goods to be 7.666 to capture the steady state mark-up of 1.15 for the case of 
East-Asian countries.  Elekdag et al. (2005) normalize the elasticity of substitution between 
domestic and imported goods to be unity in the case study of South Korea. Devereux et al. 
(2005) assign the value of unity to the elasticity of substitution between traded and non-traded 
in the analysis of emerging economies.  
Taking the value between 0.7 (as in Cook & Devereux (2006a)) and 1 (as in Elekdag 
et al. (2005)), the value for η  or the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign 
                                                          
4 Adolfson (2001) assigns this parameter to be 10 in her simulations.  
 goods is set equal to 0.9. A high value of η  implies that the domestic output gap is very 
sensitive to terms of trade movements. Gali & Monacelli (2005) set this parameter to unity. 
Reducing the value for this parameter does not affect the main findings of analysis. The 
values for mη  and dη  indicate the mark-up in domestic sector and import sector. These 
parameters take different values, depending on the model structure and assumptions of 
authors. Focusing the analysis in Thailand, Tanboon (2008) sets 1.20 to the mark-up for 
domestic sector. Sutthasri (2007) empirically calculates and shows that the range for this 
parameter is within 1.13 to 1.32 for Thailand. In this chapter, both mη  and dη  are assumed to 
share the same value of 5 which implies the mark-up for imported and domestic sectors (
1
m
m
η
η−
 and 
1
d
d
η
η−
) of 1.25 which is slightly higher than 1.2, the mark-up in OECD countries 
in the literature (Choudhri (2005)). Reducing the mark-up for both sectors (i.e. increasing the 
value of mη  and dη ) does not change the main results of analysis.   
Following Lindé, Nessén & Söderström (2004), relative risk aversion, σ  takes the 
value of 1.2. The same value also assigned in Justiniano & Preston (2004) for the small open 
economy analysis. Elekdag et al. (2005) report the posterior value of 1.67 for this parameter 
in the case of South Korea when setting the prior value of 3 to this parameter. This value is 
consistent to the results of Eichenbaum et al. (1988) who found the values of 0.5-3 for this 
parameter. Barsky et al. (1987) and Hall (1988), on the other hand, suggest the values greater 
than 5. Testing with different values, Choudhri (2005) finds that this parameter does not 
generate large variations in the outcomes.   
The parameter for technology θ  is set equal to 0.46, the values set for the small open 
economy in literature (for example Lindé, Nessén & Söderström (2004) and Adolfson 
(2001)). The habit formation parameter, h is assumed to be 0.8 as in Flamini (2004). This 
value is consistent to the value assigned in Tanboon (2008) of 0.85 for the case of Thailand. 
Based on the data of 1994 to 2006, GMM estimation indicates the value of 0.84 to 0.88 for 
this parameter for Thailand (Tanboon, 2008). φ  measures the cost of intermediation in the 
foreign bond market. It indicates the degree of vulnerability of domestic financial economy to 
shocks. If this parameter takes the value away from zero, the domestic financial accelerator 
and balance sheet are weak (Elekdag et al. (2005)). Elekdag et al. (2005) show that the 
implied annually risk premium for South Korea take the value of 11-13% when testing with 
different prior values (0.2 versus 0.07).  In this chapter, this parameter is set to be 0.10. The 
same value also applied in Merola (2006). Testing with a very low value for this parameter 
does not change the main results of analysis. Lindé, Nessén & Söderström (2004) find that 
this parameter takes the reasonable range of 0 to 0.115 in the case of small open economy 
(Sweden). The parameter fχ  is the income elasticity of foreign consumption and is assumed 
to be 0.9 as in Flamini (2005) and Adolfson (2001). The domestic economy is assumed to 
follow a Taylor policy rule. The central bank’s loss function preference on inflation target is 
1.0 and the relative preference for output is 0.5.    
Most of the empirical studies on the business cycles and policy regimes or optimum 
currency area (OCA)  for Asia investigate the relative importance of domestic and foreign 
shocks from the forecast error variance decompositions without giving information on the 
persistency of shocks. Although some of the Asian or East-Asian countries show certain level 
of symmetry in shocks, in general most of these countries are driven by country specific 
shocks and that foreign shocks play a relatively small role in the economic of East-Asia (for 
example, Sun & An (2008), Chow & Kim (2003) and Hoffmaister & Roldós (1997). Due to 
the lack of information for the persistency of shocks in East-Asia and that shocks are 
idiosyncratic and asymmetric, it is hard to make a general assumption on the persistency of 
shocks for the whole East-Asian countries in this study. Following the step of some studies, 
this chapter conducts the simulations by assuming all the shocks share the same persistency of 
 0.7 and standard error of 0.35
 
. The robustness of the results are checked by repeating 
simulations for different persistencies and standard errors of shocks, alternative 
parameterization, different policy weighting and different policy targeting. The 
parameterization is summarized in Table 3. 
5 Results 
 
5.1 The degree of exchange rate pass-through 
 
The performances of the optimized restricted simple rules are evaluated in terms of policy 
absolute loss, relative loss of the each rule to the unrestricted and restricted optimized 
baseline Taylor rule and variances. Assuming the domestic economy is hit by six shocks 
simultaneously with the same persistency of shocks, various restricted optimized simple rules 
under different degrees of exchange rate pass-through are compared. All simulations are 
based on the CPI inflation targeting rules.  
Table 4 displays the results of policy reaction coefficients for various rules under 
three different degrees of exchange rate pass-through. By observing the coefficients of the 
baseline Taylor rule (rule TR), one may find that the optimized coefficient of the policy rule 
to inflation impulse becomes larger when the pass-through rate is higher. This is because 
higher pass-through induces greater external shocks which require greater policy reaction and 
hence higher coefficient for inflation in the policy rule.  The same result also holds for the 
optimized coefficient of interest rate smoothing term. The optimized coefficient for the 
smoothing term is relatively smaller for the low pass-through case in compare to higher pass-
through case (see rule TRS). This implies higher weight on interest rate stabilization for the 
high pass-through case compared to the low pass-through case. However, as mentioned in 
Adolfson (2001), the smoothing coefficient may not necessary larger in the full pass-through 
case. For instance under low exchange rate pass-through case, the exchange rate disturbance 
on import price is small but persistent as it takes longer time to reach the steady state due to 
the low pass-through. Hence, the interest rate can be more persistent in the low pass-through 
case which induces higher coefficient of smoothing term for the low pass-through case.  
The optimized coefficient to exchange rate is increasing in the degree of exchange 
rate pass-through. This result indicates that exchange rate plays a more important role in 
transmitting the inflation disturbances when pass-through is higher. Hence, augmenting the 
policy with exchange rate term induces larger improvement in term of lower welfare loss in 
the high pass-through case. For the augmented Taylor rule that include the exchange rate 
term, the coefficients of policy reaction to inflation and smoothing term are decreasing in 
contrast to the coefficient to exchange rate. This implies higher role of exchange rate relative 
to these variables in absorbing shock under higher pass-through case.  
The optimized coefficient for the current inflation term is negative but to its lagged 
term is positive in the rules that react to lagged inflation term (rule TRH, TRHE, TRHI and 
TRHIE). Or equivalently, the optimized coefficient for the current inflation is positive but the 
expectation term is negative. This is due to the mean reverting behavior of inflation. 
Assuming that shocks to inflation induce temporary deviation from the steady state, the 
central bank will raise the interest rate to control the current inflation but reduces the rate for 
the next period.  
The policy absolute loss and relative loss provide comparisons on the performances 
of various rules. Relative loss (1) indicates the relative loss of each rule to the loss of 
unrestricted optimized rule that reacts to output and inflation (in this case, CPI inflation). 
Relative loss (2) is the relative loss of each rule to the loss of restricted optimized Taylor rule, 
i.e. rule TR. The relative loss (2) shows that the unrestricted optimized rule always performs 
better than the restricted optimized rule. However, restricted optimized rule can perform 
                                                          
5 Among the papers that conduct simulations by assuming same persistency or /and standard error for all shocks in 
their calibrations are Adolfson (2001), Parrado (2004); as priors parameters such as Juillard et. al (2006).  
 nearly well as the unrestricted optimized rule depending on the policy weight/ objective and 
economic conditions (for example the degree of trade openness and exchange rate pass-
through). The restricted optimized rule could perform closely to the loss of unrestricted 
optimized rule when the pass-through is very low (see Table 4) and the relative weight of 
output to inflation is very small (see Table A(5) in Appendix A). Due to its simple structure 
and easier to convey to the public, the instrument rule always served as the baseline rule for 
comparisons and policy evaluations.  
Comparing the results of absolute loss and relative loss, it is observed that exchange 
rate is welfare enhancing. Including the exchange rate term in the baseline Taylor rule reduces 
the welfare loss and the size of improvement is increasing in the degree of exchange rate pass-
through. For instance, adding the exchange rate term in the baseline rule (rule TRE1) when 
the pass-through rate is high generates lower relative loss of about 8% under unrestricted case 
and 6% under restricted case. The improvement rate is much higher than the improvement 
under low pass-through rate of about 2% for both relative loss (1) and (2). Adding the 
backward-looking components to the baseline rule such as the smoothing term (rule TRS and 
TRSE) and history dependent term (rule TRH and TRHE) also induces lower welfare loss. 
These history dependent rules (with and without exchange rate terms) perform better than the 
baseline rule with exchange rate term (rule TRE1 and TRE2). These rules allow gradual 
adjustment in prices and provide additional information to the policy maker which helps to 
reduce the variances or biases in the policy decisions. Similarly, the rules with forward-
looking component with and without exchange rate term (rule TRF and TRFE) are welfare 
enhancing as well. In line with previous studies, the strict inflation targeting rule performs 
badly in all cases. This rule generates higher welfare loss and variance in output although the 
variance in consumer and domestic inflation are relatively low.  
Apart from these results, the hybrid rules with and without exchange rate term (rule 
TRHI and TRHIE) outperform the other rules. The hybrid rule with exchange rate term (rule 
TRHIE) is superior to all rules under three cases of exchange rate pass-through as it 
incorporates both inertia and expectation on inflation in forming the policy reaction function.  
Similar to other rules, this rule performs the best under high pass-through case. The results 
show that exchange rate plays an improving role in the setups of policy rules and suggest that 
the superior rule should react to exchange rate term and in hybrid form at least in the model 
applied in this chapter. The role of exchange rate in the design of monetary policy becomes 
more important by generating higher improvement in term of lower welfare loss the higher 
the pass-through rate is.  
  Table 4: Policy rules based on CPI inflation targeting 
Policy 
rules 
Structure of rules Absolute 
loss 
Relative 
loss (1) 
Relative 
loss (2) 
V(y) V(pi_c) V(pi_d) 
 
TR 
TRE1 
TRE2 
TRS 
TRSE 
TRH 
TRHE 
TRF 
TRFE 
TRHI 
TRHIE 
SIT 
(I) Low Pass-through (LPT) 
4.0672 0.7838ct t ti yπ= +  
3.3052 0.7388 0.6218ct t t ti y eπ= + + ∆  
3.8437 0.7155 0.6509ct t t ti y qπ= + + ∆  
10.4097(6.9229 1.4811 ) 0.5903
c
t t t ti y iπ −= + +  
10.5260(5.7392 1.1856 0.2637 ) 0.4740
c
t t t t ti y q iπ −= + + ∆ +  
10.1344 1.3147 5.1208
c c
t t t ti yπ π −= − + +  
10.1046 1.3104 5.0800 0.0127
c c
t t t t ti y qπ π −= − + + + ∆  
110.3116 1.3733 6.0511
c c
t t t t ti y Eπ π += + −  
17.3369 1.0307 3.5657 0.5767
c c
t t t t t ti y E qπ π += + − + ∆  
1 112.3299 1.6414 10.4782 10.5053
c c c
t t t t t ti y Eπ π π+ −= − + + +  
1 114.1222 1.7117 11.4474 11.6714 0.2152
c c c
t t t t t t ti y E qπ π π+ −= − + + + − ∆  
2.9495 ct ti π=  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The absolute loss for the unrestricted optimal rule is 7.7595 (LPT) 
 
 
9.0475 
8.8836 
8.8708 
8.8606 
8.8596 
8.5466 
8.5465 
8.8784 
8.7977 
8.4250 
8.4092 
9.7732 
 
1.1660 
1.1449 
1.1432 
1.1419 
1.1418 
1.1014 
1.1014 
1.1442 
1.1338 
1.0858 
1.0837 
1.2595 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.0000 
0.9819 
0.9804 
0.9793 
0.9792 
0.9446 
0.9446 
0.9813 
0.9724 
0.9312 
0.9294 
1.0802 
 
14.6269 
14.4803 
14.4594 
14.4449 
14.4430 
13.4515 
13.4497 
14.0356 
14.0089 
13.2371 
13.2024 
17.4570 
 
1.7341 
1.6434 
1.6411 
1.6382 
1.6381 
1.8208 
1.8217 
1.8607 
1.7932 
1.8065 
1.8080 
1.0447 
 
2.1774 
2.1287 
2.1318 
2.1429 
2.1413 
2.2544 
2.2555 
2.2535 
2.2201 
2.3011 
2.2987 
1.5232 
 Policy 
rules 
Structure of rules Absolute 
loss 
Relative 
loss (1) 
Relative 
loss (2) 
V(y) V(pi_c) V(pi_d) 
 
TR 
TRE1 
TRE2 
TRS 
TRSE 
TRH 
TRHE 
TRF 
TRFE 
TRHI 
TRHIE 
SIT 
(I) Medium Pass-through (MPT) 
4.3654 0.7574ct t ti yπ= +  
2.7248 0.5471 0.8852ct t t ti y eπ= + + ∆  
3.4403 0.5082 0.8975ct t t ti y qπ= + + ∆  
10.2450(8.7878 1.6153 ) 0.7550
c
t t t ti y iπ −= + +  
10.7058(4.0961 0.6422 0.7928 ) 0.2942
c
t t t t ti y q iπ −= + + ∆ +  
12.1167 1.3426 7.2538
c c
t t t ti yπ π −= − + +  
11.4926 1.2633 6.4139 0.3461
c c
t t t t ti y qπ π −= − + + + ∆  
148.1194 5.0276 38.2074
c c
t t t t ti y Eπ π += + −  
122.1188 2.3825 16.5192 1.2801
c c
t t t t t ti y E qπ π += + − + ∆  
1 110.4521 0.8331 7.6111 8.1704
c c c
t t t t t ti y Eπ π π+ −= − + + +  
1 110.8971 0.7962 8.5805 8.0006 0.2168
c c c
t t t t t t ti y E qπ π π+ −= − + + + + ∆  
2.9609 ct ti π=  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The absolute loss for the unrestricted optimal rule is 7.4371 (MPT)  
 
 
 
9.4600 
9.0059 
8.9787 
8.9949 
8.9736 
8.5018 
8.4669 
8.8023 
8.7282 
8.3946 
8.3352 
10.0483 
 
1.2720 
1.2109 
1.2073 
1.2095 
1.2066 
1.1432 
1.1385 
1.1836 
1.1736 
1.1287 
1.1208 
1.3571 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.0000 
0.9520 
0.9491 
0.9508 
0.9486 
0.8987 
0.8950 
0.9305 
0.9226 
0.8874 
0.8811 
1.0622 
 
16.0062 
15.3979 
15.3322 
15.3289 
15.3071 
13.8760 
13.8081 
14.5677 
14.4444 
13.4491 
13.4214 
18.3728 
 
1.4569 
1.3070 
1.3126 
1.3305 
1.3201 
1.5635 
1.5628 
1.5185 
1.5060 
1.6701 
1.6245 
0.8619 
 
1.6466 
1.7681 
1.7859 
1.7998 
1.7980 
1.9568 
1.9994 
1.8389 
1.9173 
2.0877 
2.0816 
1.0556 
 Policy 
rules 
Structure of rules Absolute 
loss 
Relative 
loss (1) 
Relative 
loss (2) 
V(y) V(pi_c) V(pi_d) 
 
TR 
TRE1 
TRE2 
TRS 
TRSE 
TRH 
TRHE 
TRF 
TRFE 
TRHI 
TRHIE 
SIT  
(III) High Pass-through (HPT) 
5.1006 0.9671ct t ti yπ= +  
2.6532 0.5285 0.9389ct t t ti y eπ= + + ∆  
3.4057 0.4869 0.9434ct t t ti y qπ= + + ∆  
10.2097(9.8849 1.7955 ) 0.7903
c
t t t ti y iπ −= + +  
10.7338(3.9635 0.5979 0.8651 ) 0.2662
c
t t t t i ti y q iπ −= + + ∆ +  
11.9050 1.2685 6.8399
c c
t t t ti yπ π −= − + +  
11.5849 1.2387 6.4270 0.4766
c c
t t t t ti y qπ π −= − + + + ∆  
1158.76 16.4361 130.94
c c
t t t t ti y Eπ π += + −  
122.6218 2.3939 17.0349 1.3583
c c
t t t t t ti y E qπ π += + − + ∆  
1 11.4794 1.3237 0.4422 6.9311
c c c
t t t t t ti y Eπ π π+ −= − + − +  
1 16.8162 0.8532 5.2333 6.5886 0.4908
c c c
t t t t t t ti y E qπ π π+ −= − + + + + ∆  
2.95 ct ti π=  
 
The absolute loss for the unrestricted optimal rule is 7.4402 (HPT). 
 
 
9.6447 
9.0578 
9.0276 
9.0518 
9.0234 
8.5718 
8.4827 
8.8406 
8.7871 
8.5713 
8.4147 
10.2797 
 
1.2963 
1.2174 
1.2134 
1.2166 
1.2128 
1.1521 
1.1401 
1.1882 
1.1810 
1.1520 
1.1310 
1.3816 
 
1.0000 
0.9391 
0.9360 
0.9385 
0.9356 
0.8887 
0.8795 
0.9166 
0.9111 
0.8887 
0.8724 
1.0658 
 
16.3594 
15.5365 
15.4608 
15.4613 
15.4354 
13.9502 
13.8666 
14.6524 
14.8993 
13.9714 
13.5893 
18.6645 
 
 
1.4650 
1.2895 
1.2972 
1.3211 
1.3057 
1.5967 
1.5494 
1.5145 
1.4820 
1.5856 
1.6200 
0.9475 
 
1.5398 
1.7216 
1.7409 
1.7529 
1.7518 
1.9402 
1.9950 
1.8367 
1.8993 
1.9312 
2.0926 
0.9867 
Notes: Relative loss (1) refers to the ratio of absolute loss of each simply rule to  the absolute loss of unrestricted optimized rule that reacts to output and inflation; relative loss (2) indicates the 
relative loss of each simple rule to the loss of restricted optimized rule that react to both output and inflation, i.e rule TR. The absolute loss for unrestricted rule are 7.7595 (LPT), 7.4371 (MPT) 
and 7.4402 (HPT). 
 
 5.2 The effects of trade openness  
 
How does the trade openness of one economy affect the policies performances? Does trade 
openness matter in determining the exchange rate pass-through and hence, influences the 
conduct of monetary policies? Adolfson (2001) states that economy with higher trade 
openness implies that the economy is more open to external shocks, hence greater impacts of 
foreign shocks to that economy. Under such condition, the exchange rate channel plays a 
greater role in the monetary policy transmission similar to the case of high degree of 
exchange rate pass-through. However, this condition does not necessary hold (as can be seen 
in the results later). 
On the other hand, Ho & McCauley (2003) on their study in several emerging 
economies show that openness per se is not significantly correlated with exchange rate pass-
through. They note that although Latin American countries have lower degree of trade 
openness than Asian countries have, the pass-through in Latin American countries is stronger 
than that of Asian countries. However, they find that low income and high inflation history 
are significantly correlated with exchange rate pass-through.  
Following Adolfson (2001), the degree of trade openness is represented by three 
parameters, the import and export shares ( mω  and xω ) and share of imported intermediate 
inputs in production κ . The higher the values of these parameters indicate the more open one 
economy is. In order to generate higher trade openness κ , mω  and xω  take the values of 
0.60, 0.30 and 0.40 respectively which are higher than the values set in the previous section6
 
. 
The more open one economy is, the higher are the exposure of foreign disturbances to that 
economy and greater responses of policy reaction function to such disturbances. The opposite 
condition holds if the economy has a low degree of trade openness.  
Table 5: Effects of higher trade openness on performances of simple rules 
Rules LPT MPT HPT 
 Absolute 
loss 
Relative 
loss (1) 
Relative 
loss (2) 
Absolute 
loss  
Relative 
loss (1) 
Relative 
loss (2) 
Absolute 
loss 
Relative 
loss (1) 
Relative 
loss (2) 
TR 
TRE1 
TRE2 
TRS 
TRSE 
TRH 
TRHE 
TRF 
TRFE 
TRHI 
TRHIE 
SIT 
8.2443 
8.2137 
8.2074 
8.1901 
8.1867 
7.9597 
7.9593 
8.1188 
8.1013 
7.8918 
7.8844 
9.1387 
1.2108 
1.2063 
1.2054 
1.2029 
1.2024 
1.1690 
1.1690 
1.1924 
1.1898 
1.1590 
1.1580 
1.3422 
1.0000 
0.9963 
0.9955 
0.9934 
0.9930 
0.9655 
0.9654 
0.9848 
0.9826 
0.9572 
0.9563 
1.1085 
8.6983 
8.5217 
8.4880 
8.4538 
8.4519 
8.1157 
8.0760 
8.4714 
8.2497 
8.1151 
8.0289 
9.4402 
1.1935 
1.1693 
1.1646 
1.1599 
1.1597 
1.1136 
1.1081 
1.1624 
1.1319 
1.1135 
1.1016 
1.2953 
1.0000 
0.9797 
0.9758 
0.9719 
0.9717 
0.9330 
0.9284 
0.9739 
0.9484 
0.9329 
0.9230 
1.0853 
8.8591 
8.5901 
8.5486 
8.5187 
8.5127 
8.2788 
8.1536 
8.3530 
8.3485 
8.1980 
8.1517 
9.6896 
1.2074 
1.1708 
1.1651 
1.1610 
1.1602 
1.1283 
1.1113 
1.1384 
1.1378 
1.1173 
1.1110 
1.3206 
1.0000 
0.9697 
0.9649 
0.9617 
0.9609 
0.9345 
0.9203 
0.9429 
0.9423 
0.9254 
0.9201 
1.0937 
Notes: Relative loss (1) refers to the ratio of absolute loss of each simply rule to  the absolute loss of unrestricted 
optimized rule that reacts to output and inflation; relative loss (2) indicates the relative loss of each simple rule to 
the loss of restricted optimized rule that react to both output and inflation, i.e. rule TR. The absolute loss for 
unrestricted rule are 6.8089 (LPT), 7.2881 (MPT) and 7.3372 (HPT). 
 
Table 5 shows the results of objective loss for different restricted optimized CPI 
inflation targeting simple rules under different degrees of trade openness and exchange rate 
pass-through. Comparing the results in Table 5 with the one in Table 4, it is observed that the 
results summarized in both tables are consistent to each other. The augmented Taylor rules 
with history dependent terms with and without exchange rate terms outperform the baseline 
Taylor rule. The hybrid rule with exchange rate term is superior to all rules. These rules 
perform better under high pass-through case. In contrast, the strict inflation targeting rule and 
the forecast based inflation targeting perform badly in all cases.  
                                                          
6 The parameterizations for other parameters hold the same. 
 Apart from these results, it is observed that the size of improvement is larger in Table 
4 than in Table 5. This means that the size of improvement is slightly smaller for the more 
open economy case. The reason is under more open economy (which is analog to greater 
pass-through case), although the effect of foreign disturbances to the domestic economy is 
greater, the price distortion due to import price stickiness is smaller. The variability in 
exchange rate is relatively smaller in compare to lower open economy (see Table 6). 
Exchange rate plays a lower role in adjusting prices. Hence the size of improvement by 
including the exchange rate term in the baseline rule could be smaller under more open 
economy case.  
Table 6 summarizes the unconditional variances for several variables under different 
degrees of trade openness and exchange rate pass-through. The variances change as the 
degrees of openness change. As discussed in Adolfson (2001), a more open economy implies 
larger reactions of policy to foreign shocks but lower policy response to that of domestic 
shocks. When the economy is more open, foreign shocks have greater impacts or influences 
on the domestic variables, for example the price level. This in turn requires larger adjustments 
in output. Therefore, the domestic economy that is more open may experience greater 
variability in price level (domestic price) and output. On the other hand, the variability in 
nominal and real exchange rate becomes smaller the more open the economy is. The reason is 
exchange rate plays a lower role in price adjustment following greater impacts of foreign 
shocks on domestic price level. In other words, the stabilization or price adjustment is 
achieved through output rather than via exchange rate channel (Adolfson, 2001).  
 
Table B.6: Effects of trade openness – comparisons of variances 
(A1) Case I: Lower openness 
Rules V(y) V(pi_d) V(pi_m) V(pi_c) V(de) V(tau) V(i) V(q) 
TR 
LPT 
MPT 
HPT 
 
14.6269 
16.0063 
16.3594 
 
2.1774 
1.6466 
1.5398 
 
7.6463 
13.8713 
17.6913 
 
1.7341 
1.4569 
1.4650 
 
25.7702 
21.6085 
20.6722 
 
67.6450 
72.4076 
76.8307 
 
9.5303 
7.8970 
8.6851 
 
56.7161 
61.8679 
63.8991 
TRHE 
LPT 
MPT 
HPT 
 
13.4497 
13.8081 
13.8666 
 
2.2555 
1.9995 
1.9950 
 
7.9478 
10.6336 
11.9329 
 
1.8217 
1.5628 
1.5494 
 
20.2646 
15.8241 
14.6092 
 
68.4413 
68.5658 
69.4808 
 
9.7099 
9.5814 
9.4330 
 
57.7384 
57.9402 
57.5995 
(B) Case II: Higher openness 
Rules V(y) V(pi_d) V(pi_m) V(pi_c) V(de) V(tau) V(i) V(q) 
TR 
LPT 
MPT 
HPT 
 
14.1828 
15.4737 
15.9189 
 
2.0803 
1.5397 
1.4120 
 
3.0174 
4.4448 
4.8126 
 
1.1529 
0.9615 
0.8996 
 
9.3829 
5.8053 
5.1683 
 
40.2751 
42.0751 
43.1282 
 
4.4347 
3.7117 
4.2052 
 
20.8452 
20.9507 
21.3067 
TRHE 
LPT 
MPT 
HPT 
 
13.4627 
13.8745 
13.9968 
 
2.1588 
2.0437 
2.0848 
 
3.0189 
3.4201 
3.4867 
 
1.2280 
1.1388 
1.1552 
 
8.48851 
5.5562 
4.3175 
 
40.0783 
39.4153 
39.1804 
 
4.2343 
3.8647 
3.6793 
 
21.4773 
20.0845 
19.4907 
 
5.3 Robustness checking 
 
One of the problems that the monetary authorities face when setting the monetary policy is 
the problem of uncertainty, for example uncertainties about the structure of economy and the 
types of shocks hitting the economy. According to Apel et al. (1999), the presence of 
uncertainty means the central bank has a limited knowledge of economic functions and it 
cannot formulate monetary policy in the optimal manner. One of the solutions to this problem 
is to search policy rules that are robust under all uncertainties and that are implementable, 
transparent and sufficiently sophisticated to include the factors that should be considered in 
the monetary policy decisions. This section investigates the robustness of various restricted 
optimized simple rules from two main aspects namely uncertainty about persistency of shocks 
and robustness under different policy weightings. The investigations are conducted by 
focusing on CPI inflation targeting rules.  
 5.3.1 Uncertainty about persistency of shocks 
 
The nature and the inertia of shocks are crucial in affecting the monetary policy decision-
making. This is because the emerging markets are very open in trade and vulnerable to the 
hits of external shocks. In the previous section, all shocks are assumed to share the same 
persistency of 0.7 and standard error of 0.3. However in reality, different types of shocks may 
have different persistency and the persistency could be higher or lower than 0.7. Since the 
persistency of shocks may change over time and vary across countries, it is very difficult to 
know the persistency for different shocks. In order to investigate if the performances of policy 
rules are robust under different persistency of shocks, robustness tests are conducted by 
adjusting different persistency for shocks. In the first case, all shocks share the same and 
higher inertia of 0.8 with the standard error of 0.4. In the second case, domestic shocks are 
more persistent than the foreign shocks with the inertia of 0.7 versus 0.4 and standard error of 
0.3 versus 0.2. The third case assumes that foreign shocks are more persistent than the 
domestic shocks. The persistency for foreign shocks (foreign policy shock, foreign demand 
and supply shocks) is 0.9 with the standard error of 0.4. The persistency for domestic shocks 
(exchange rate shock, domestic demand and supply shocks) is 0.6 with the standard error of 
0.3. The analysis is based on CPI inflation targeting rules. The results are summarized in 
Table A(4a-c), Appendix A.  
 
Table 8a: Specifications for shocks (1) 
Case I: 
Same persistency and variation of all shocks 
Persistency: 0.8 
Standard error: 0.4 
Case II:  
Higher persistency and variation of domestic shocks 
Persistency: 0.7 versus 0.4 
Standard error: 0.3 versus 0.2 
Case III:  
Higher persistency and variation of foreign shocks 
Persistency: 0.9 versus 0.4 
Standard error: 0.6 versus 0.3 
 
The results from these three cases indicate that the augmented more complicated 
Taylor rules are robust under uncertainty about persistency of shocks. The welfare loss is 
higher for higher pass-through case. Augmenting the baseline rule with exchange rate terms, 
history dependent term and hybrid form are able to reduce the welfare loss of the baseline 
rule. These rules perform better under high degree of exchange rate pass-through. The hybrid 
rule with exchange rate term is superior to other rules. The forecast based inflation targeting 
and strict inflation targeting rules perform badly. These results hold by changing the 
persistency of shocks. However, changing the persistency of shocks may change the ranking 
of these rules. The ranking for the hybrid rule with and without exchange rate term does not 
change. This type of rule performs the best under different persistency of shocks.  
 
5.3.2 Robustness under different policy weightings  
 
How does the performance of policy rule change by asserting different weightings on the 
targeted variables in the policy loss function? This section checks the robustness of policy 
rules by assuming different weightings on policy loss function. In the previous section, the 
results are based on the simulations of policy loss function under the weightings of 1.0 and 
0.5 for both inflation variable and output respectively. The results from previous section are 
compared with two cases of weightings here. The first case assumes both the weighting on 
inflation and output variables are 1.0. The second case assumes the weightings on output is 
0.1 compared to 1.0 on inflation variable. The analysis is focused on CPI inflation targeting 
rules. The results are summarized in Table A(4), Appendix A. 
 
The results show that it is more welfare beneficial to give higher weight to inflation 
but a smaller weight to output variable because giving higher weight to output variable may 
generate higher welfare loss. This implies that stabilizing inflation is less costly compared to 
output as the public know and expect the future inflation will be lower. The conservative 
central banker tends to be more inflation averse by asserting higher weight on inflation. As in 
 the case of different persistency of shocks, the more complicated rules perform better than the 
baseline rule under different weighting and exchange rate pass-through. However, changing 
the weighting in the loss function may change the ranking on the performances of these rules. 
On the other hand, the hybrid rule with and without exchange rate term outperforms all the 
other rules irrespective the degree of exchange rate pass-through and weighting. The size of 
improvement for these rules becomes larger under higher degree of exchange rate pass-
through with the exception of the case where the weight on output is 0.1. Under very low 
weighting on output variable case, the size of improvement for the high pass-through case is 
lower than the medium pass-through case. The reason is analog to the case of very open 
economy case. When the pass-through is very high, the effects of external shocks are very 
large but the distortion on domestic and consumer prices due to stickiness on import price is 
very low. Exchange rate plays a small role in adjusting the price. Hence, lower improvement 
induced by exchange rate under very high pass-through case. Moreover, output is more 
volatile and needs larger adjustment under higher pass-through case. Stabilization is realized 
through more on output adjustment. Assigning a very small weight on output stabilization (for 
instance 0.1) given that the pass-through is very high may affect the efficiency on the 
performances of the policy rules.   
 
6 Conclusion 
 
The role of exchange rate in the formation of monetary policy for the small and open 
economy is always a topic of interest among economists and researchers. Previous studies 
have proposed various modifications on the Taylor rule to be implemented in the open 
economy context. However, as these studies report controversial results, it is not clear if the 
augmented more complicated rules perform better than the closed economy rule.  
This paper seeks to investigate this issue in the case of small open economy of East-
Asian countries, focusing on the impacts of exchange rate pass-through, trade openness, the 
source and persistency of shocks. Simulations are carried out to compare various simple rules 
in term of welfare loss and variability. The results suggest the inclusion of exchange rate term 
in the policy reaction function as this type of rule generates lower loss. Adding the history 
dependent term in the baseline policy rule also helps to reduce the welfare loss. The hybrid 
rule with exchange rate term is superior to the other rules. These more complicated rules work 
more efficient under high degree of pass-through as the size of improvement is higher under 
higher pass-through case. Besides determined by the degree of exchange rate pass-through, 
the performances of policy rules also depend on trade openness, weighting of policy reaction 
function and persistency of shocks. These factors can influence the size of improvement and 
the ranking on the performances of policy rules. However, these more complicated rules are 
robust in the sense that they always show improvements irrespective these factors. The strict 
inflation targeting rule performs badly in all cases. Moreover, the policy maker can influence 
the domestic inflation indirectly by reacting to exchange rate movements.  
To summarize the total results, including the exchange rate term in the monetary 
policy could be welfare enhancing. However, the effectiveness role of exchange rate depends 
crucially on the economic structures and features such as the degree of exchange rate pass-
through, the source of shocks and trade openness which are of country specific. These factors 
should be highlighted in the formation of monetary policy rules and decisions.  
When it comes to the choice of the best policy regime, there is no one best regime fits 
for all countries and forever. Rather, it is conditional on the economic circumstances and 
policy preferences which differ across countries and change over time. Perhaps, the choice of 
appropriate monetary policy/ regime should allow flexibility and stability elements (for 
example implementing a flexible inflation targeting or giving a weight to exchange rate in the 
policy rule) rather than defend on a particular rate as mentioned in Cavoli & Rajan (2003). 
The flexibility strategies allow the authority to react to various shocks in order to meet other 
goals when the inflation target is consistent with the target and relinquish other goals to meet 
the inflation target when the inflation level is far from the target.  
 
 References 
 
Adolfson,M., Laseen,S, Lindé,J. & Villani,M. 2005. Bayesian estimation of an open economy 
DSGE model with incomplete pass-through. Sveriges riksbank working paper series no. 
179. 
Adolfson,M., Lindé,J. & Villani,M. 2006. Forecasting performance of an open economy 
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. Working paper. Sveriges RiksBank. 
Adolfson,M. 2001. Monetary policy and exchange rates-breakthrough of pass-through. The 
Economic Research Institute, University of Stockholm. 
Adolfson,M. 2007. Incomplete exchange rate pass-through and simple monetary policy rules. 
Journal of International Money and Finance 26: 468-494. 
Alfaro,L. 2002. Inflation, openness and exchange rate regimes. The quest for short-term 
commitment. Harvard Business school.  
Altig,D. et al. 2002. Technology shocks and aggregate fluctuations. Manuscript, Sveriges 
RiksBank.  
An,S. & Schorfheide,F. 2006. Bayesian analysis of DSGE models. Singapore Management 
University & University of Pennsylvania. CEPR & NBER. 
Apel,M., Nessen,M., Soderstrom,U. & Vredin,A. 1999. Different ways of conducting 
inflation targeting – theory and practice. Quarterly review 4/1999. 
Artis,M. & Ehrmann,M. 2006. The exchange rate – a shock absorber or source of shocks? A 
study of four open economies. Journal of International Money and Finance 25: 874-893.  
Ball,L. 1998. Policy rules for open economies. NBER working paper series 6760. 
Ball,L. 1999. Policy rules for open economies. In: Taylor,J.B (Ed.). Monetary policy rules. 
The University of Chicago Press: 127-156. 
Ball,L. 2000. Policy rules and external shocks. NBER working paper series 7910. 
Barsky,R.F., Thomas,J., Miles,S. K. & Matthew,D. S.1987.Preference Parameters and 
Behavioral Heterogeneity: An Experimental approach in the Health and Retirement 
Study,” Quarterly Journal of Economics,112, 537-579. 
Batini,N. & Haldane,A. 1998. Forward-looking rules for monetary policy. Bank of England.  
Batini,N., Harrision,R. & Millard,S.P. 2001. Monetary policy rules for an open economy. 
Bank of England. 
Benigno,P. 2001. Price stability with imperfect financial integration. New York University 
and CEPR.  
Brainard,W. 1967. Uncertainty and the effectiveness of policy. American Economic Review, 
57(2): 411-425. 
Brischetto,A. & Voss,G. 1999. A structural vector autregression model of monetary policy in 
Australia. Bank of Australia Research Discussion paper 1999-11.  
Bussière,M & Peltonen,T. 2008. Exchange rate pass-through in the global economy: the role 
of emerging market economies. ECB working paper no. 951/October 2008. 
Calvo,G.A. & Mishkin,F.S. 2003. The mirage of exchange rate regimes for emerging market 
countries. NBER working paper 9808. 
Campa,J.M., Golberg,L.S. & González-Mínguez,J.M. 2005. Exchange rate pass-through to 
import prices in the Euro area. NBER working paper. 
Campa,J.M. & Goldberg,L.S. 2002a. Exchange rate pass-through into import prices. NBER 
working paper. 
Campa,J.M. & Goldberg,L.S. 2002b. Exchange rate pass-through into import prices: a macro 
or micro phenomenon? NBER working paper. 
Campa,J.M. & González-Mínguez,J.M. 2002. Differences in exchange rate pass-through in 
Euro area. Universidad de Navarra. 
Cavoli,T. and Rajan,R. 2003. Designing appropriate exchange rate regimes for East Asia: 
inflation targeting and monetary policy rules. University of Adelaide. Discussion paper 
no. 0309. 
Choudhri,E.U. 2005. Monetary policy in a small emerging economy: exploring desirable 
interest rate rules. Carleton University. 
 Choudhri.E.U. & Hakura, D.S. 2006. Exchange rate pass-through to domestic prices: Does 
the inflationary environment matter? Journal of International Money and Finance 25: 614-
639. 
Chow,H.K. & Kim Y. 2003. A common currency peg in East Asia? Perspectives from 
Western Europe. Journal of Macroeconomics 25: 331-350.  
Christiano,L.J., Eichenbaum,M. & Evans,C.L. 1998. Monetary policy shocks: what have we 
learned and to what end? NBER working paper 6400. 
Christiano,L.J., Eichenbaum,M. & Evans,C.L. 2001. Nominal rigidities and the dynamics 
effects of a shock to monetary policy. Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. Working paper 
01-07. 
Clarida,R.H., Gali,J. & Gertler,M. 2001. Optimal monetary policy in closed versus open 
economies: An intergrated approach. NBER no 8604. 
Cook,D. & Devereux,M.B. 2006a. Accounting for the East Asian crisis: a quantitative model 
of capital outflows in small open economies. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking. Vol. 
38 (3): 721-749. 
Cook,D. & Deveruex,M.B. 2006b. External currency pricing and the East Asian crisis. 
Journal of International Economics 69: 37-63. 
Corsetti,G. 2005. Openness and the case for flexible exchange rates. European University 
Institute. Working papers no. 2005/21. 
Côté,D. & Lam, J. 2001. Simple rules in the M1-VECM. Bank of Canada. 
Côté,D et. al. 2002. The performance and robustness of simple monetary policy rules in 
models of the Canadian economy. Manuscript, Bank of Canada. 
Côté,D, Kuszczak,J, Lam,J.P, Liu,Y & St-Amant,P. 2002. The performance and robustness 
simple monetary policy rules in models of the Canadian economy. Bank of Canada. 
Technical report no. 92.  
De Fiore,F. & Liu,Z. 2002. Openness and equilibrium determinacy under interest rate rules. 
European Central Bank. Working paper no. 173. 
DeJong,D.N., Ingram,B.F. & Whiteman,C.H. 1997. A Bayesian approach to dynamic 
macroeconomics. Then University of Pittsburgh & The University of Iowa. 
Dennis,R. 2000. Optimal simple targeting rules for small open economies. Federal Reserve 
Bank of San Francisco. 
Dennis,R. 2001. Solving for optimal simple rules in rational expectations models. Federal 
Reserve Bank of San Francisco. 
Dennis,R. 2003. New Keynesian optimal-policy models: an empirical assessment. Federal 
Reserve Bank of San Francisco. 
Desroches,B. 2004. The transmission of world shocks to emerging market countries: an 
empirical analysis. Bank of Canada working paper 2004-44.  
Devereux, M.B., Lane,P.R. & Xu,J. 2005. Exchange rate and monetary policy in emerging 
market economies. The Institute for International Integration Studies Discussion paper 
series.  
Devereux,M.B. & Lane,P.R. 2003. Understanding bilateral exchange rate volatility. Journal of 
International Economics 60: 109-132. 
Devereux,M.B. & Poon,D. 2004. A simple model of optimal monetary policy with financial 
constraints. The University of British Columbia.  
Devereux,M.B., Lane, P.R. & Xu,J. 2006. Exchange rate and monetary policy in emerging 
market economies. The Economic Journal 116: 478-506. 
Devereux M.B. & Yetman,J. 2009.Price adjustment and exchange rate pass-through. Journal 
of International Money and Finance xxx: 1-20. 
Dobrynskaya,U. 2008. The monetary and exchange rate policy of the Central Bank of Russia 
under asymmetrical price rigidity. Journal of Innovations Economics. 1(1): 29-62. 
Edwards,S. 2006. The relationship between exchange rates and inflation targeting revisited. 
NBER working paper series no. 12163. 
Eichenbaum,M,S., Hansen,L.P. & Singleton,K.J. 1988. A Time series analysis of 
representative agent models of consumption and leisure choice under uncertainty. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 103, 51-78. 
 Elekdag,S., Justiniano,A. & Tchakarov,I. 2005. An estimated small open economy model of 
the financial accelerator. IMF working paper Wp/05/44. 
Flamini,A. 2005. Inflation targeting and exchange rate pass-through. Graduate Institute of 
International Studies. Working paper no. 04/2004. 
Fraga,A. et al. 2003. Inflation targeting in emerging market economies. In: Getler, Mark & 
Keneth Rogoff, orgs. NBER Macroeconomics Annual 18. MIT Press: 365-400. 
Frankel,J.A. & Rose,A.K. 1998. The endogeneity of the optimum currency area criteria. The 
Economic Journal 108: 1009-1025. 
Fuhrer, J.C. 2000b. Habit Formation in consumption and its implications for monetary policy 
models. American Economic Review, 90, No. 3 :367–90. 
Fuhrer,J.C. 1998. An optimizing model for monetary policy analysis: can habit formation 
help? Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. 
Fuhrer,J.C. 2000a. Optimal monetary policy in a model with habit formation. Federal Reserve 
Bank of Boston. 
Gagnon,J.E. & Ihrig,J. 2004. Monetary policy and exchange rate pass-through. Board of 
Governors of Federal Reserve System. 
Gali,J. & Gertler,M. 1999. Inflation dynamics: a structural econometric analysis. Journal of 
Monetary Economics. 44: 195-222. 
Gali,J. & Monacelli,T. 2005. Monetary policy and exchange rate volatility in a small open 
economy. The Review of Economic Studies: 72(3). 
Garretsen,H., Moons.G. & Aarle,B. 2005. Monetary policy in the Euro area: an analysis using 
a stylized New Keynesian model. Utrecht University, University of Antwerp & 
University of Maastricht. 
Gerlach,S. & Smets,F. 2000. MCIs and monetary policy. European Economic Review 44: 
1677-1700. 
Giannoni,M.P. & Woodford,M. 2003. Notes on model for ‘optimal inflation targeting rules’. 
Columbia University and Princeton University. 
Giovanni,J. & Levchenko,A.A. 2008. Trade openness and volatility. IMF working paper 
WP/08/146. 
Giuliodori,M. 2004. Nominal shocks and the current account: a structural VAR analysis of 14 
OECD countries. Review of World Economics vol 140(4): 569-592. 
Goodhart,C. & Hofmann,B. 2005. The Phillips curve, the IS curve and monetary 
transmissionL evidence for the US and the Euro area. CESifo Economic Studies, vol. 51: 
757-775. 
Hall,R.E. 1988. Intertemporal substitution in consumption. The Journal of Political Economy. 
Vol. 96(2): 339-357. 
Hausmann,R., Panizza,U. & Stein,E. 1999. Why do countries float the way they float? Journal 
of Development Economics 66: 387-414. 
Ho,C. & McCauley,R.N. 2003. Living with flexible exchange rates: issues and recent 
experience in inflation targeting emergin market economies. BIS working papers no. 130.  
Hoffmaister,A.W. & Roldós,J.E. 1997. Are business cycles different in Asia and Latin 
America? IMF working paper WP/97/9.  
Hoffmann,M. 2005. Fixed versus flexible exchange rate: evidence from developing countries. 
University of Cologne.  
Ito,T., Sasaki,Y.N. & Sato,K. 2005. Pass-through of exchange rate changes and 
macroeconomic shocks to domestic inflation in East Asian countries. RIETI discussion 
paper series 05-E-020. 
Jeanfils,P.2001. A guided tour of the world of rational expectations models and optimal 
policies. National Bank of Belgium. 
Juillard,M. et. al. 2005. Welfare-based monetary rules in an estimated DSGE model of the US 
economy. GEPREMAP. 
Juillard,M. et. al. 2006. Welfare-based monetary rules in an estimated DSGE model of the US 
economy. ECB working paper no. 613.  
Justiniano,A. & Preston,B. 2004. Small open economy DSGE models: specification, 
estimation and model fit. IMF and Columbia University. 
 Kimura,T. & Kurozumi,T. 2002. Effectiveness of history-dependent monetary policy. Bank of 
Japan. 
Kirsanova,T., Leith,C. & Wren-Lewis,S. 2006. Should central banks target consumer prices 
or the exchange rate? The Economic Journal, 116:F208-F231. 
Kollman,R. 2004. Welfare effects of a Monetary Union: the role of trade openness. Journal of 
the European Economic Association. 2(2-3): 289-301. 
Leitemo,K. & Soderstrom,U. 2004. Robust monetary policy in the New Keynesian 
framework. Discussion paper no. 4805. Centre for Economic Policy Research. 
Leitemo,K. & Söderström,U. 2005. Simple monetary policy rules and exchange rate 
uncertainty. Journal of International Money and Finance 24: 481-507. 
Levin,A., Wieland,V. & Williams,J.1998. Robustness of simple monetary policy rules under 
model uncertainty. Natioanal Bureau of Economic Research. Working paper 6570. 
Lindé,J, Nessén,M. & Söderström,U. 2004. Monetary policy in an estimated open economy 
model with imperfect pass-through. Sveriges Riksbank. Working paper no. 167. 
Lubik,T. & Schorfheide,F. 2005. A Bayesian look at New Open Economy Macroecomics. 
Johns Hopkins University & University of Pennsylvania. 
Maih,J. 2005. A symmetric trade and nominal rigidities in a DSGE perspective: implications 
for the transmission of shocks and real exchange rate dynamics. Dissertation for the PhD 
degree. University of Oslo. 
Mayer,E. 2003. The mechanics of a reasonably fitted quarterly New Keynesian macro model. 
Universität Würzburg Economic papers. No.41. 
Mayer,E. 2004. The mechanics of a reasonably fitted quarterly New Keynesian macro model. 
University of Würzburg.  
Merola,R. 2006. A small open economy model with financial accelerator. Université 
Catholique de Louvain la neuve.  
Minella,A. et. al. 2003. Inflation targeting in Brazil. Constructing credibility under exchange 
rate volatility. Journal of International Money and Finance. 22: 1015-1040. 
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. Trade structure underlying East Asian growth – 
advancement of triangular trade in: White paper on International Economy and trade 
2005.  METI. 
Mishkin,F. S. 2000. Inflation targeting in emerging market countries. NBER working paper 
series no. 7618. 
Moessner,R. 2005. Optimal discretionary policy and uncertainty about inflation persistence. 
European Central Bank. Working paper no. 540. 
Mohamed,D. 2006. Hybrid inflation and price level targeting in small open economy. MRPA.  
Mohanty,M.S. & Klau,M. 2004. Monetary policy rules in emerging market economies: issues 
and evidence. BIS working papers no. 149. 
Mohanty,M.S. & Klau,M. 2005. Monetary policy rules in emerging market economies: Issues 
and evidence in: Monetary policy and macroeconomic stabilization in Latin America, eds. 
Rolf J. Langhammer and Lucio Vinhas de Souza. The Kiel Institute.  
Monacelli,T. 2003. Moentary policy in a low pass-through environment. ECB working paper 
no. 227. 
Nogueira Junior,R.P. 2007. Inflation targeting and the role of exchange rate pass-through. 
University of Kent. 
Orphanides,A. 1998. Monetary policy evaluation with noisy information. Finance and 
Economics Discussion paper no 1998-50. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System. 
Osawa,N. 2006. Monetary policy responses to the exchange rate: empirical evidence from 
three East Asian inflation-targeting countries. Bank of Japan working paper series no. 06-
E-14. 
Parrado,E. 2004. Inflation targeting and exchange rate rules in an open economy. IMF 
working paper WP/04/21. 
Pytlarczyk,E. 2005. An estimated DSGE model for the German economy within the Euro 
area. Universitat Hamburg. 
 Ratto,M., Röger,W., Veld,J. & Girardi,R. 2005. An estimated new Keynesian dynamic 
stochastic general equilibrium model of the Euro area. European Economy. Economic 
paper no. 220. European Commission. 
Rudebusch,G.D. & Svensson,L.E.O. 1998. Policy rules for inflation targeting, in Taylor,J 
(ed.), Monetary policy rules. University of Chicago Press. 203-253. 
Ruge-Murcia,F.J. 2003. Methods to estimate dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models. 
Universite de Montreal.  
Sack,B. & Wieland,V. 1999. Interest rate smoothing and optimal monetary policy: a review of 
recent empirical evidence. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 
Schmidt-Hebbel,K. & Werner,A. 2002. Inflation targeting in Brazil, Chile and Mexico: 
performance, credibility and the exchange rate. Economia. 2(2): 31-89. 
Senay,O. 2001. The role of the exchange rate in monetary policy rules. Middle East Technical 
University and University of York. 
Smets,F. & Wouters,R. 2002a. Openness, imperfect exchange rate pass-through and monetary 
policy. NBB working paper no. 19. 
Smets,F. & Wouters,R. 2002b. An estimated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of 
the Euro area. National Bank of Belgium working papers-research series. 
Smets,F. & Wouters,R. 2004. Forecasting with a Bayesian DSGE model: an applications to 
the Euro area. National Bank of Belgium working papers-research series no. 60.  
Söderlind,P. 1999. Solution and estimation of RE macromodel with optimal policy. European 
Economic Reiew 43: 813-823. 
Söderlind,P. 2003. Lecture notes for monetary policy (PhD course at UNISG). University of 
St. Gallen and CEPR. 
Söderström,U. 2000. Monetary policy with uncertain parameters. European Central Bank. 
Working paper no. 13.  
Sun,W. & An,L. 2008. Asymmetric shocks and exchange rate regimes in East Asia. 
International Research Journal of Finance and Economics 22: 38-48. 
Sutthasri,P. 2007. Parameter calibration for the Bank of Thailand DSGE model (in Thai). In: 
Tanboon,S. 2008. The Bank of Thailand structural model for policy analysis. Bank of 
Thailand. 
Svensson,L.E.O & Woodford,M. 2000. Indicator variables for optimal policy. NBER working 
paper No. 7953. 
Svensson,L.E.O. 1997. Inflation targeting: some extensions. NBER working paper No. 5962. 
Svensson,L.E.O. 1998. Inflation targeting as a monetary policy rule. CEPR and NBER. 
Svensson,L.E.O & Woodford,M. 2003. Implementing optimal policy through inflation 
forecast targeting. Princeton University.  
Svensson,L.E.O. 2003. What is wrong with Taylor rules? Using judgment in monetary policy 
through targeting rules. Journal of Economic Literature 41: 426-477. 
Svensson,L.E.O. 2007. Optimization under commitment and discretion, the recursive saddle 
point method, and targeting rules and instrument rules: Lecture notes. Princeton 
University. 
Tanboon,S. 2007. Stylized facts of the Thai economy. In: Tanboon,S. 2008. The Bank of 
Thailand structural model for policy analysis. Bank of Thailand.  
Tanboon,S. 2008. The Bank of Thailand structural model for policy analysis. Bank of 
Thailand.  
Taylor,J.B. 1999. The robustness and efficiency of monetary policy rules as guidelines for 
interest rate setting by the European Central Bank. Journal of Monetary Economics 43: 
655-679. 
Taylor,J.B. 2001. The role of the exchange rate in monetary policy rules. American Economic 
Review 91(2): 263-267. 
Taylor,J.B. 2000. Low inflation, pass-through, and the pricing power of firms. European 
Economic Review. 44(7): 1389-1408. 
Villani,M. & Warne,A. 2003. Monetary policy analysis in a small open economy using 
Bayesian cointegrated structural VARs. Sveriges Riksbank working paper series no. 156. 
 Wang,L. 2005. Degree of openness and the choice of exchange rate regimes – a re-evaluation 
with value-added based openness measures. Dissertation. Universität Hohenheim.  
Welz,P. 2005. Quantitative New Keynesian macroeconomics and monetary policy. Uppsala 
Universitet. 
Welz,P. 2006. Assessing predetermined expectations in the standard sticky-price model: a 
Bayesian approach. ECB working paper series no. 621. 
Wohltmann,H-W. & Winkler,R. 2008. Anticipated and unanticipated oil price shocks and 
optimal monetary policy. Christian-Albrechts-Universitat Kiel. Economic working paper 
no. 2008-05. 
Wollmershäuser,T. 2006. Should central banks react to exchange rate movements? An 
analysis of the robustness of simple rules under exchange rate uncertainty. Journal of 
Macroeconomics 28: 493-519. 
Woodford,M. 2001. The Taylor rule and optimal monetary policy. Princeton University.  
Woodford,M. 2002. Optimal interest rate smoothing. Princeton University. 
 
 
 
 
 APPENDIX A 
 
Table A(1): Share of exports in domestic production ( xω ) 
Countries 1980-96 1999-2006 
Indonesia 
Korea 
Malaysia 
Philippines 
Singapore 
Thailand 
24.05 
28.46 
60.82 
18.19 
138.33 
24.64 
31.48 
33.16 
99.43 
45.78 
164.42 
56.93 
Average1 
Average2 
49.08 
23.84 
71.87 
41.84 
Source: the original series for annually export and GDP are obtained from IMF. 
Omega_x is calculated as total export over GDP (in percent). 
Average1 is the average values of all countries 
Average2 is the average values of all countries but exclude Malaysia and Singapore 
 
Table A(2a): Components of imported goods 
Countries Year Components of imported goods (%) 
  % raw parts capital manufacturing/ 
material 
Consumption 
mω  
Intermediate 
κ  
Indonesia 1980 
1990 
2003 
23.7 
12.2 
20.3 
8.5 
28.4 
13.5 
17.9 
28.4 
13.5 
42.4 
37.2 
46.1 
7.4 
7.1 
7.6 
74.6 
77.8 
79.9 
Korea 1980 
1990 
2003 
48.0 
19.6 
19.5 
8.5 
16.6 
23.0 
14.3 
25.4 
15.3 
26.6 
32.5 
33.0 
2.6 
5.9 
9.2 
83.1 
68.7 
75.5 
Malaysia 1980 
1990 
2003 
15.1 
4.7 
5.2 
18.0 
26.0 
47.9 
15.6 
27.5 
15.0 
34.8 
30.4 
23.9 
16.4 
11.4 
7.9 
67.9 
61.1 
77.0 
Philippines 1980 
1990 
2003 
34.6 
20.7 
9.9 
10.5 
15.6 
48.8 
15.4 
14.4 
7.9 
34.5 
38.7 
25.8 
5.1 
10.6 
7.7 
79.6 
75.0 
84.5 
Thailand 1980 
1990 
2003 
30.5 
10.1 
14.5 
11.8 
21.6 
26.0 
9.7 
21.7 
18.1 
40.1 
37.1 
33.1 
8.0 
9.5 
8.3 
82.4 
68.8 
73.6 
Source:  Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry, RIETI-TID (2005) 
Intermediate goods = total % of the raw, parts and manufacturing/ material. 
 
Table A(2b): Intermediate goods and consumption goods 
Countries Average % consumption goods on 
total imports 
Average % intermediate goods on total 
imports 
 1980-1996 1999-2005 1980-1996 1999-2005 
Indonesia 
Korea 
Malaysia 
Philippines 
Singapore 
Thailand 
6.58 
4.82 
12.64 
8.41 
13.97 
8.61 
7.10 
8.19 
7.75 
8.00 
11.41 
7.77 
57.03 
45.39 
59.62 
53.31 
46.89 
58.95 
61.00 
54.83 
71.71 
72.13 
62.82 
60.64 
Average1 
Average2 
9.17 
7.11 
8.37 
7.77 
53.53 
53.67 
63.86 
62.15 
Source: the original series for annually imported intermediate and consumption goods are obtained from Research 
Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry,  RIETI-TID. 
The values in the table are calculated by the author. 
Average1 is the average values of all countries 
Average2 is the average values of all countries but exclude Malaysia and Singapore 
 
 
 
 
 Table A(3): Notations for the parameters 
Parameter Notation 
θ  
β  
mγ  
dγ  
mα  
dα  
κ  
h 
xω  
mω  
σ  
η  
fχ  
mη  
dη  
φ  
technology parameter 
discount factor 
adjustment cost of production in import sector 
adjustment cost of production in domestic sector 
fraction of rule of thumb price setters in import sector 
fraction of rule of thumb price setters in domestic sector 
share of imported inputs for production 
habit formation parameter 
share of exports in domestic production 
share of imports in domestic consumption 
risk aversion parameter 
elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods income elasticity 
of foreign consumption 
elasticity of substitution across goods in import sector 
elasticity of substitution across goods in domestic sector 
risk premium in foreign bond market 
 
Table A(4a): Performances of simple rules, persistency =0.8 and std. error=0.4 
Rules Low PT Medium PT High PT 
 Absolute 
loss 
Relative 
loss (1) 
Relative 
loss (2) 
Absolute 
loss (1) 
Relative 
loss (2) 
Relative 
loss (1)  
Absolute 
loss (2) 
Relative 
loss (1) 
Relative 
loss (2) 
TR 
TRE1 
TRE2 
TRS 
TRSE 
TRH 
TRHE 
TRF 
TRFE 
TRHI 
TRHIE 
SIT 
34.5265 
34.2197 
34.1981 
34.1233 
34.1154 
33.1053 
33.1044 
34.1071 
33.9232 
32.7564 
32.7564 
36.6007 
1.0879 
1.0783 
1.0776 
1.0752 
1.0750 
1.0432 
1.0431 
1.0747 
1.0689 
1.0322 
1.0322 
1.1533 
1.0000 
0.9911 
0.9905 
0.9883 
0.9881 
0.9588 
0.9588 
0.9878 
0.9825 
0.9487 
0.9487 
1.0601 
34.8595 
34.2090 
34.1633 
34.0904 
34.0888 
32.5297 
32.4423 
33.3702 
33.3264 
32.2080 
32.2080 
36.4347 
1.2106 
1.1880 
1.1864 
1.1839 
1.1838 
1.1297 
1.1266 
1.1588 
1.1573 
1.1185 
1.1185 
1.2653 
1.0000 
0.9813 
0.9800 
0.9779 
0.9779 
0.9331 
0.9306 
0.9508 
0.9560 
0.9239 
0.9239 
1.0452 
35.2320 
34.3432 
34.2893 
34.2220 
34.2162 
32.7649 
32.5221 
33.5002 
33.4999 
32.7480 
32.7480 
36.8484 
1.2248 
1.1939 
1.1920 
1.1897 
1.1895 
1.1390 
1.1306 
1.1646 
1.1645 
1.1384 
1.1384 
1.2810 
1.0000 
0.9748 
0.9732 
0.9713 
0.9711 
0.9300 
0.9231 
0.9573 
0.9508 
0.9295 
0.9295 
1.0459 
Notes: Relative loss (1) refers to the ratio of absolute loss of each simply rule to  the absolute loss of unrestricted 
optimized rule that reacts to output and inflation; relative loss (2) indicates the relative loss of each simple rule to 
the loss of restricted optimized rule that react to both output and inflation, i.e rule TR. The absolute loss for 
unrestricted rule are 31.7354 (LPT), 28.7961 (MPT) and 28.7664 (HPT). 
 Table A(4b): Higher persistency and std. error of domestic shocks 
Rules Low PT Medium PT High PT 
 Absolute 
loss 
Relative 
loss (1) 
Relative 
loss (2) 
Absolute 
loss 
Relative 
loss (1) 
Relative 
loss (2) 
Absolute 
loss 
Relative 
loss (1) 
Relative 
loss (2) 
TR 
TRE1 
TRE2 
TRS 
TRSE 
TRH 
TRHE 
TRF 
TRFE 
TRHI 
TRHIE 
SIT 
9.0317 
8.8568 
8.8541 
8.8480 
8.8465 
8.5308 
8.5307 
8.8632 
8.7814 
8.4119 
8.3956 
9.7550 
1.1656 
1.1430 
1.1427 
1.1419 
1.1417 
1.1010 
1.1009 
1.1439 
1.1333 
1.0856 
1.0835 
1.2590 
1.0000 
0.9806 
0.9803 
0.9797 
0.9795 
0.9445 
0.9445 
0.9813 
0.9723 
0.9314 
0.9296 
1.0801 
9.4459 
8.9661 
8.9607 
8.9837 
8.9589 
8.4866 
8.4522 
8.7908 
8.7161 
8.3719 
8.3148 
10.0302 
1.2717 
1.2071 
1.2064 
1.2095 
1.2061 
1.1425 
1.1397 
1.1835 
1.1734 
1.1271 
1.1194 
1.3503 
1.0000 
0.9492 
0.9486 
0.9511 
0.9484 
0.8984 
0.8948 
0.9306 
0.9227 
0.8863 
0.8803 
1.0619 
9.6316 
9.0154 
9.0094 
9.0404 
9.0081 
8.5555 
8.4680 
8.8290 
8.7751 
8.5555 
8.3946 
10.2611 
1.2961 
1.2132 
1.2124 
1.2166 
1.2122 
1.1513 
1.1395 
1.1881 
1.1809 
1.1513 
1.1297 
1.3808 
1.0000 
0.9360 
0.9354 
0.9386 
0.9353 
0.8883 
0.8792 
0.9167 
0.9111 
0.8883 
0.8716 
1.0654 
Notes: Definition of relative loss (1) and (2) are as footnote of Table II(2a). The absolute loss for unrestricted 
optimized rule are 7.7485 (LPT), 7.4279 (MPT) and 7.4311 (HPT). 
 
Table A(4c): Higher persistency and std. error of foreign shocks 
Rules Low PT Medium PT High PT 
 Absolute 
loss 
Relative 
loss (1) 
Relative 
loss (2) 
Absolute 
loss  
Relative 
loss (1)  
Relative 
loss (2) 
Absolute 
loss  
Relative 
loss (1) 
Relative 
loss (2) 
TR 
TRE1 
TRE2 
TRS 
TRSE 
TRH 
TRHE 
TRF 
TRFE 
TRHI 
TRHIE 
SIT 
2.6273 
2.6273 
2.5828 
2.4988 
2.4899 
2.4928 
2.4922 
2.6258 
2.5712 
2.3258 
2.3230 
2.7997 
1.2415 
1.2415 
1.2204 
1.1807 
1.1765 
1.1779 
1.1776 
1.2408 
1.2150 
1.0990 
1.0977 
1.3229 
1.0000 
1.0000 
0.9830 
0.9511 
0.9477 
0.9488 
0.9486 
0.9994 
0.9786 
0.8852 
0.8842 
1.0656 
2.7678 
2.6761 
2.5752 
2.4999 
2.4998 
2.4684 
2.4568 
2.6441 
2.5704 
2.3772 
2.3589 
2.9373 
1.3162 
1.2726 
1.2247 
1.1888 
1.1888 
1.1739 
1.1683 
1.2574 
1.2224 
1.1305 
1.1218 
1.3969 
1.0000 
0.9668 
0.9304 
0.9032 
0.9032 
0.8918 
0.8876 
0.9553 
0.9287 
0.8589 
0.8522 
1.0612 
2.8178 
2.6888 
2.5847 
2.5149 
2.5139 
2.4859 
2.4553 
2.6567 
2.5784 
2.4803 
2.3885 
2.7997 
1.3357 
1.2746 
1.2252 
1.1921 
1.1916 
1.1784 
1.1639 
1.1593 
1.2222 
1.1757 
1.1322 
1.3271 
1.0000 
0.9542 
0.9173 
0.8925 
0.8921 
0.8822 
0.8713 
0.9428 
0.9150 
0.8802 
0.8476 
0.9936 
Notes: Definition of relative loss (1) and (2) are as footnote of Table II(2a). The absolute loss for unrestricted 
optimized rule are 2.1163 (LPT), 2.1028 (MPT) and 2.1096 (HPT).
 Table A(5): Policy rules under different weighting 
Rules Case I 
πγ =1.0, yγ =1.0 
Case II 
πγ =1.0, yγ =0.5 
Case III 
πγ =1.0, yγ =0.1 
 Absolute 
loss 
Relative 
loss (1) 
Relative 
loss (2) 
Absolute 
loss 
Relative 
loss (1)  
Relative 
loss (2) 
Absolute 
loss 
Relative 
loss (1) 
Relative 
loss (2) 
Low PT 
TR 
TRE1 
TRE2 
TRS 
TRSE 
TRH 
TRHE 
TRF 
TRFE 
TRHI 
TRHIE 
SIT 
 
15.5689 
15.3728 
15.3544 
15.3369 
15.3363 
14.4913 
14.4829 
15.0703 
14.9596 
14.2633 
14.2406 
18.2446 
 
1.3187 
1.3021 
1.3005 
1.2990 
1.2990 
1.2274 
1.2267 
1.2765 
1.2672 
1.2081 
1.2062 
1.5464 
 
1.0000 
0.9874 
0.9862 
0.9851 
0.9850 
0.9308 
0.9302 
0.9860 
0.9608 
0.9161 
0.9147 
1.1718 
 
9.0475 
8.8836 
8.8708 
8.8606 
8.8596 
8.5466 
8.5465 
8.8784 
8.7977 
8.4250 
8.4092 
9.7732 
 
1.1660 
1.1449 
1.1432 
1.1419 
1.1418 
1.1014 
1.1014 
1.1442 
1.1338 
1.0858 
1.0837 
1.2595 
 
1.0000 
0.9819 
0.9804 
0.9793 
0.9792 
0.9446 
0.9446 
0.9813 
0.9724 
0.9312 
0.9294 
1.0802 
 
3.0710 
2.9453 
2.9423 
2.9315 
2.9303 
2.9157 
2.9157 
2.9989 
2.9422 
2.8864 
2.8847 
3.2325 
 
1.0939 
1.0491 
1.0480 
1.0442 
1.0427 
1.0385 
1.0385 
1.0682 
1.0480 
1.0281 
1.0275 
1.1514 
 
1.0000 
0.9591 
0.9581 
0.9546 
0.9542 
0.9494 
0.9494 
0.9765 
0.9581 
0.9399 
0.9393 
1.0526 
Medium  PT 
TR 
TRE1 
TRE2 
TRS 
TRSE 
TRH 
TRHE 
TRF 
TRFE 
TRHI 
TRHIE 
SIT 
 
16.4610 
15.8760 
15.8255 
15.8098 
15.7963 
14.5968 
14.5291 
15.2297 
15.1043 
14.2371 
14.1731 
18.8280 
 
1.3695 
1.3208 
1.3166 
1.3153 
1.3142 
1.2144 
1.2087 
1.2670 
1.2566 
1.1845 
1.1791 
1.5664 
 
1.0000 
0.9644 
0.9614 
0.9604 
0.9596 
0.8867 
0.8826 
0.9252 
0.9176 
0.8649 
0.8610 
1.1438 
 
9.4600 
9.0059 
8.9787 
8.9949 
8.9736 
8.5018 
8.4669 
8.8023 
8.7282 
8.3946 
8.3352 
10.0483 
 
1.2720 
1.2109 
1.2073 
1.2095 
1.2066 
1.1432 
1.1385 
1.1836 
1.1736 
1.1287 
1.1208 
1.3571 
 
1.0000 
0.9520 
0.9491 
0.9508 
0.9486 
0.8987 
0.8950 
0.9305 
0.9226 
0.8874 
0.8811 
1.0622 
 
2.1807 
2.1011 
2.0987 
2.1008 
2.0985 
2.0740 
2.0655 
2.1109 
2.0910 
2.0739 
2.0538 
2.2114 
 
1.1047 
1.0644 
1.0632 
1.0642 
1.0631 
1.0517 
1.0464 
1.0694 
1.0593 
1.0506 
1.0404 
1.1203 
 
1.0000 
0.9635 
0.9624 
0.9633 
0.9623 
0.9511 
0.9472 
0.9680 
0.9588 
0.9510 
0.9418 
1.0459 
High PT 
TR 
TRE1 
TRE2 
TRS 
TRSE 
TRH 
TRHE 
TRF 
TRFE 
TRHI 
TRHIE 
SIT 
 
16.7359 
15.9864 
15.9288 
15.9169 
15.8984 
14.6955 
14.5706 
15.2986 
15.2282 
14.6494 
14.3226 
19.1541 
 
1.3918 
1.3294 
1.3247 
1.3237 
1.3221 
1.2221 
1.2117 
1.2722 
1.2664 
1.2183 
1.1911 
1.5929 
 
1.0000 
0.9552 
0.9518 
0.9510 
0.9499 
0.8781 
0.8706 
0.9141 
0.9099 
0.8753 
0.8558 
1.1445 
 
9.6447 
9.0578 
9.0276 
9.0518 
9.0234 
8.5718 
8.4827 
8.8406 
8.7871 
8.5713 
8.4147 
10.2797 
 
1.2963 
1.2174 
1.2134 
1.2166 
1.2128 
1.1521 
1.1401 
1.1882 
1.1810 
1.1520 
1.1310 
1.3816 
 
1.0000 
0.9391 
0.9360 
0.9385 
0.9356 
0.8887 
0.8795 
0.9166 
0.9111 
0.8887 
0.8724 
1.0658 
 
2.1637 
2.0971 
2.0947 
2.0989 
2.0947 
2.1009 
2.0578 
2.1019 
2.0848 
2.0726 
2.0572 
2.2386 
 
1.0988 
1.0650 
1.0638 
1.0659 
1.0638 
1.0669 
1.0450 
1.0674 
1.0588 
1.0526 
1.0447 
1.1369 
 
1.0000 
0.9692 
0.9681 
0.9700 
0.9681 
0.9710 
0.9510 
0.9714 
0.9635 
0.9579 
0.9508 
1.1204 
Notes: Definition of relative loss (1) and (2) are as footnote of Table II(2a). The absolute loss for unrestricted 
optimized rule are as follows: 
Case I: 11.8064 (LPT), 12.0300 (MPT) and 12.0249 (HPT) 
Case II: 7.7595 (LPT), 7.4371 (MPT) and 7.4402 (HPT) 
Case III: 2.8075 (LPT), 1.9740 (MPT) and 1.9691 (HPT) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 APPENDIX B 
 
 
Solution and estimation of rational expectation model 
 
This appendix summarizes the solution and estimation of the rational expectation model 
discussed in Söderlind (1999), Adolfson (2001) and Söderlind (2003).  
 
The complete model of equations (1) to (18) can be written in a state space representation 
form: 
1, 1 1, 1
2, 1 2, 2 20
t t t
t
t t t n x
x x
A Bi
E x x
ε+ +
+
     
= + +     
    
       (1) 
or 1 1t t t tx Ax Bi ξ+ += + +  
where 1,tx  is a 1( 1)n ×  vector of predetermined variables with the initial value 1,0x  is given. 
The 2( 1)n ×  vector of non-predetermined or forward-looking variables is denoted as 2,tx . ti  
is a ( 1)k ×  vector of policy instruments and 1tε +  represents a 1( 1)n ×  vector of innovations to 
1,tx . 
 
In this chapter, the predetermined, non-predetermined variables and the shocks are:  
'
1, 1
f f f y e f
t t t t t t t t t t t tx i y i u u u a x
ππ τ τ− =    with (11 1)×  dimensions 
'
2,
d m c
t t t t t t t tx y q q eπ π π = ∆ ∆   with (7 1)×  dimensions 
'
0 0 0 0 0yf if f y et t t t t t tu u u
π πε υ υ υ =    with (11 1)×  dimensions 
 
Optimal policy with commitment rule 
 
The problem of optimal unrestricted policy under commitment is to minimize the following 
loss function subject to the constraint in equation (1): 
' ' '
0 0
0
2t t t t t t t
t
J E x Qx x Ui i Riβ
∞
=
 = + + ∑  
s.t  1 1t t t tx Ax Bi ξ+ += + +   where 1 1 2, 1 2, 1( , )t t t t tx E xξ ε+ + + += −  
 
The problem is solved by forming the Lagrangian function: 
' ' ' '
0 0 1 1 1
0
min 2 2 (
t
t
t t t t t t t t t t ti t
L E x Qx x Ui i Ri Ax Bi xβ ρ ξ
∞
+ + +
=
 = + + + + + − ∑   (2) 
 
The first order condition with costate vector  1tρ +   with respect to ti  and tx  are: 
' '
1t t t tB E U x Riρ +− = +  
'
1t t t t tA E Qx Uiβ ρ ρ β β+ = − −  
 
Q, U and R are matrices mapping the targeting variables in the loss function to the state 
variables (see Adolfson (2001) for more details).  
 
By grouping 1, 2,( , )t t tx x x=  and 1, 2,( , )t t tρ ρ ρ=  and reorder the rows where 1,tx  is placing 
before  2,tρ , the result can be written in the following form: 
 1
1
t t
t
t t
k k
GE D
λ λ
+
+
   
=   
   
        (3) 
where 1,
2,
t
t
t
x
k
ρ
 
=  
 
 and 
2,
1,
t
t t
t
x
iλ
ρ
 
 =  
  
 
 
 
Generalized Schur Decomposition 
 
Since matrix G is singular, generalized Schur decomposition is applied here. The square 
matrices G and D satisfy the following generalized Schur decomposition given that Q and Z 
are unitary, S and T are upper triangular (Söderlind (1999)).  
HG QSZ=          (4a) 
HD QTZ=          (4b) 
 
The decomposition is reordered to allow the stable generalized eigenvalues to come first. 
Define the auxiliary variables θ   and δ  as: 
t tH
t t
k
Z
θ
δ λ
   
=   
   
        (5) 
 
By applying the generalized Schur decomposition of (4a) and (4b) and premultiply (5) with 
the non-singular matrix HQ  give the following: 
1
1
t tH H H H
t
t t
k k
Q QSZ E Q QTZ
λ λ
+
+
   
=   
   
      (6) 
 
1
1
t tH H
t
t t
k k
SZ E TZ
λ λ
+
+
   
=   
   
 
 
1
1
t t
t
t t
SE T
θ θ
δ δ
+
+
   
=   
   
 
1
10 0
t t
t
t t
S S T T
E
S T
θθ θδ θθ θδ
δδ δδ
θ θ
δ δ
+
+
       
=       
       
 
 
In order to get a stable solution, we must have 0tδ =  for all t and the solution is: 
1
1t t tE S Tθθ θθθ θ
−
+ =         (7) 
given that Sθθ  is invertible.  
 
Invert (5) and partition: 
t k k t k
t
t t
k Z Z Z
Z Z Z
θ δ θ
λθ λδ λθ
θ
θ
λ δ
       
= =       
       
      (8) 
Since 0tδ = , we get the solution 
1,0
0 00 k
x
k Z θθ
 
= = 
 
 and 10 0kZ kθθ
−=  if kZ θ  is invertible.  
 
 The solutions for the other variables are (see Söderlind, 1999 for more details): 
2,
1,1
2,
1,
t
t
t k
t
t
x
x
i Z Zλθ θ ρ
ρ
−
 
   =   
   
        (9) 
 
Optimal simple rule 
 
Assume that the policy maker could commit to a simple decision rule: 
1,
2,
t
t
t
x
i F
x
 
= −  
 
         (10) 
 
Substituting (10) into (1): 
1, 1 1,
1
2, 1 2,
( )t t t t
t t t
x x
A BF Bi
E x x
ε+ +
+
   
= − + +   
   
     (11) 
 
A necessary condition for a unique equilibrium solution for the expectation difference 
equations (11) is (A-BF) should have the number of stable roots equal to the number of 
predetermined variables (Söderlind (1999)). Given that F implies a unique equilibrium, the 
solution to the dynamic of the model is: 
1, 1 1,t tx Mx+ =          (12) 
2, 1,t tx Cx=          (13) 
where 1k kM Z T Zθ θθ θ
−=  and 1kC Z Zλθ θ
−=  are obtained using a Schur Decompostion of (A-BF).  
 
The loss function value is: 
'
0 1,0 1,0 ( )1
J x Vx tr Vβ
β
= + Σ
−
       (14) 
where ' ''
Q U
V P P M VM
U R
β
 
= + 
 
 
and 
1
1
n
n
I
P C
I
F
C
 
 
 
 =
 
  −   
  
 
 
Under an optimal simple rule, the loss function (14) is minimized subject to the restriction on 
the decision rule F with 1,0x  is given. This rule depends on the covariance matrix Σ  and the 
initial state vector 1,0x . 
 
